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Introduction 
     Having served on the editorial board of The 
Historical Journal since my sophomore year, it has 
been an honor to work as the general editor for this 
edition, the journal‘s tenth. Since its inception in 
2002, the publication has strived to present the best 
work from the department‘s variety of courses and 
array of dedicated students, and this year is no 
exception. The editorial board faced a great 
challenge in narrowing the eighteen papers that 
were submitted down to the four best that, along 
with the winner of the Edwin T. Greninger‘41 Prize 
in history, would be published. Many thanks to 
Rachel Santose ‘11, Amelia Grabowski ‘13, Kaitlin 
Reed ‘13, and Nathan Lanan ‘12 for their hard work 
in selecting papers and working one on one with the 
authors during the editing process.  
     Now to the papers themselves, which cover a 
wide range of topics, span an array of time periods, 
and focus on a variety of continents. First is Austin 
Clark‘s “100 Spears Worth 100 Pieces”: The 
Impact of Ashigaru on Sengoku Jidai, the winner of 
the Greninger Prize. Austin examines the military 
impact the ashigaru, or Japanese infantry, had on 
the Sengoku period (sixteenth century). A shift in 
importance from mounted samurai archers to these 
foot soldiers, who were armed with spears or bows, 
and related changes in discipline, training, and 
technique, transformed the ways in which battles 
during the period were fought and ultimately 
allowed for the unification of Japan.  
     Cara Elliott‘s This House which I have built: The 
Foundation of the Brattle Street Church in Boston 
2 
and Transformations in Colonial 
Congregationalism chronicles the foundation of the 
Brattle Street Church by Thomas Brattle within its 
historical and religious context. The church‘s 
foundation marked the first of the divisions in 
congregationalism in the late 1600s.  
     Brendan Quigley examines the role that Gallipoli 
has played in world history in Gallipoli: The Spark 
That Would Ignite an Empire. From the foundation 
of the Ottoman Empire in the 1300s through World 
War I, the peninsula has long been the focus of 
leaders hoping to control the region.  
     In his well-argued capstone project The Master 
of the Senate and the Presidential Hidden Hand: 
Eisenhower, Johnson, and Power Dynamics in the 
1950s, Samuel Cooper-Wall investigates the 
changes that occurred in the relationship between 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Senator 
Lyndon B. Johnson, who served as Minority and 
Majority Leader during Eisenhower‘s tenure. These 
two men, on opposite sides of the political 
spectrum, were originally able to compromise and 
work somewhat in tandem in order to achieve their 
goals. After a series of incidents, this cooperation 
ceased, but the examination of their relationship 
reveals a great deal about the ways in which these 
two men behaved as leaders.  
     Robert Kellert‘s The Quiet War: Nazi Agents in 
America tells a story that spans two continents. He 
considers both German and U.S. intelligence 
organizations during World War II and relates the 
fascinating story of Operation PASTORIOUS, a 
German intelligence maneuver within the U.S. that 
3 
ultimately failed but had implications on the ways 
in which the government treats enemies of the state 
and traitors.  
     It is my privilege to present the Fall 2011 edition 
of The Gettysburg College Historical Journal! 
 
 
Elizabeth (Lisa) Ungmach ‘11
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Author and Editor Biographies 
Elizabeth (Lisa) Ungemach ’11 is a senior History 
major, Spanish minor from Wayne, NJ. Lisa has 
served as a member of the board since her 
sophomore year. After graduation, she plans to 
spend the summer working in Musselman Library 
and the following year engaged in service work 
through AmeriCorps before enrolling in graduate 
school for a dual degree in Library Science and 
Public History.  
 
Rachel Santose ’11 is a senior History major and 
Civil War Era Studies minor from Broadview 
Heights, Ohio. In addition to serving on the editorial 
board of the Gettysburg Historical Journal, Rachel 
is also the editor of the Gettysburg College Journal 
of the Civil War Era. Next fall Rachel will begin a 
dual Masters Degree program in History and 
Library Science at Indiana University. 
 
Amelia Grabowski ’13, a sophomore, is pursuing a 
double major in English and History and a minor in 
French. Beyond working with the Historical 
Journal, Amelia also volunteers with the Center for 
Public Service (CPS) and is a member of ALLIES. 
She has been privileged to study abroad in Bath, 
England, and plans to study in Paris, France next 
year. 
 
Katlin Reed ’13 is a sophomore History and 
Spanish Literature double major from Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania. She is interested in teaching English 
as a second language or continuing her studies at a 
5 
higher level after her career at Gettysburg College. 
This is her first year with the Historical Journal and 
she is looking forward to her future work with the 
publication. 
 
Nathan Lanan ’12 is a junior History/Classics 
double major. He has always been fond of writing 
and he received the Greninger Prize for a paper 
written in his freshman year. His interests lie mainly 
around the Mediterranean Sea from Ancient to 
Medieval and Renaissance time periods, and his 
focus is in the ground-level aspects of Military 
History. He hails from Souderton, Pennsylvania 
where he was active in his Church and earned the 
rank of Eagle Scout in the Boy Scouts of America. 
If all goes well, Nathan will eventually become a 
writer of historical fiction while working as a Park 
Ranger at one of America‘s many National Parks. 
 
Austin Clark ’12 is a junior History major with a 
special interest in military history. He is also an 
amateur in the creative writing field and has spent 
time in England studying both this and his history. 
All things considered, though, there is no other 
place he would rather be to learn and create than 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. 
 
Cara Elliott ’11 is a senior History and French 
double major with an Economics minor. Apart from 
her classes, she is also a writing tutor, an assistant to 
the secretary of the French, Italian and German 
departments, and a participant in a number of 
different academic societies on-campus. Next year, 
6 
she plans to attend the College of William and 
Mary's MA/PhD program for history, with a focus 
in the American Revolutionary Era. 
 
Brendan Quigley ’11 is a senior History major, 
film minor from Manasquan, New Jersey. He 
studied abroad in Wollongong, Australia and ran 
track at Gettysburg College all four years. Brendan 
was a member of the shuttle hurdle team that set a 
college record in 2008. After graduation he will 
attend Monmouth University for a Masters in 
Teaching in the hopes of one day becoming a high 
school history teacher. 
 
Samuel Cooper-Wall ’12 is a junior History major, 
Civil War Era Studies minor from Kensington, 
Maryland. He plans to pursue a career in public 
history and has worked at the Eisenhower National 
Historic Site in Gettysburg, the Nebraska State 
Historical Society in Lincoln, Nebraska, as well as 
other positions in government service. 
 
Robert Kellert ’12 is a native of New Jersey and a 
junior at Gettysburg College. He is currently 
double-majoring in History and Philosophy, and 
minoring in Classical Studies. In his spare time, 
Robert enjoys golf, tennis, Jeopardy, movies, 
computer games, pizza, and hero sandwiches. He 
wishes to thank the History faculty for their support 
and feedback, and their commitments both to 
learning and teaching. 
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“100 Spears Worth 100 Pieces”: The 
Impact of Ashigaru on Sengoku Jidai
1
 
Austin Clark 
 
 In the year 1545, during the latter half of 
Japan‘s Sengoku Period or ―Age of Warring 
States‖, the minor samurai Ukida Naoie was 
assigned thirty men and a small fief in the province 
of Bizen. His task was to cultivate and defend this 
small corner of the province from the ambitious and 
power-hungry lords and bandits that abounded in 
the Sengoku Period, but Naoie set his sights higher. 
Given direct control over his thirty men, a mere 
garrison force of infantry, he used them to conquer 
and rule over neighboring fiefs in the province. His 
reputation and his army grew with each victory and 
before long, Naoie controlled more than a tenth of 
                                                 
1
 ―The Seventeen-Article Injunction of Asakura 
Toshikage, c. 1480,‖ in David J. Lu, ―From Civil Wars to 
Unification,‖ in Japan: A Documentary History, 171-201 
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 176. 
8 
Bizen and over half of his original thirty men had 
castles and fiefs to call their own. Naoie himself 
ruled out of Okayama castle, which he had built for 
himself, and kept a tight rein on his subordinates 
through taxation and rotation of service. In 1577 
Naoie, after taking over most of the neighboring 
Matsuda lord‘s forts and province, stormed his own 
lord‘s keep under flimsy pretenses and seized 
control of the now expanded Bizen.
2
 
 Ukida Naoie‘s bloody and meteoritic rise to 
power in the space of just thirty years was similar to 
that of several, eventually more well known 
daimyo, or Japanese feudal lords. Oda Nobunaga 
especially would write a similar story, albeit on a 
larger scale, expanding from his inherited Owari 
                                                 
2
 John Whitney Hall, ―Foundations of the Modern 
Japanese Daimyo,‖ The Journal of Asian Studies 20, No. 2 
(May 1961): 323-325. 
9 
province in south-central Japan to unite most of the 
main Japanese island of Honshū.3 This move would 
propel him into history as the first of Japan‘s great 
unifiers, three individuals who would overcome 
long odds to consolidate their power and pull Japan 
out of the tumultuous Sengoku Period. The other 
two, following almost immediately on the heels of 
Nobunaga, were Toyotomi Hideyoshi and 
Tokugawa Ieyasu, who would complete the 
centralization of power and control set in motion by 
their predecessor. Yet the enormous power and 
influence this trio of unifiers wielded did not 
materialize overnight and its genesis is somewhat 
obscure, even if the legacy it left is not. 
 The turmoil of the Sengoku Period gave 
birth to the centralized power Ukida Naoie would 
                                                 
3
 Stephen Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 
(Surrey, England: Japan Library, 1996), 132-135. 
10 
tinker with and all three of the unifiers would come 
to enjoy. As a period of constant and chaotic 
warfare, Sengoku stormed the walls of well-
established tradition and forged quite literally in the 
heat of battle a new dominant military force that 
would shape the social order of the next 350 years 
and give brilliant men like Nobunaga and Hideyoshi 
the means to come to power. The localized nature of 
the Sengoku Period fighting and the increasing role 
of technology established the infantryman as the 
decisive force on the battlefield, toppling the 
mounted samurai out of dominance and giving the 
ambitious daimyo who controlled them 
unprecedented power. The leaders who recognized 
this social shift and founded their influence in a 
large corps of disciplined, professional infantry 
11 
would emerge victorious and found their shogunal 
power in these ideas.  
 The dominance of infantry on the battlefield 
by the end of the Sengoku Period was absolute. A 
look at the muster rolls for the daimyo Gotō 
Sumiharu in 1592, part of Hideyoshi‘s ill-fated 
invasion of Korea, reveals that 90% of his force was 
made up of infantry; out of 220 men only 27 were 
samurai on horses.
4
 Takeda Shingen, a daimyo who 
became known for his use of an exceptional amount 
of cavalry, as well as his skill in using them, had a 
ratio of approximately two infantrymen to every 
horseman in his army. By 1590, when Hideyoshi 
was firmly in control and just finishing his 
unification of Japan, he ordered troops from the 
Daté household and asked that they be supplied 
                                                 
4
 Stephen Turnbull, Samurai Invasion: Japan’s 
Korean War 1592-1598, (London: Cassell & Co, 2002), 44. 
12 
with only thirty horses.
5
 At the battle of Sekigahara 
in 1600, the battle in which Tokugawa Ieyasu 
would take control of Japan from Hideyoshi‘s heir 
and lead it into centuries of peace, about 85,000 
men were involved on each side.
6
 Added together 
170,000 men fought on the small plain at 
Sekigahara, many times more than could be 
mustered simply from the elite seven to eight 
percent of a warrior society. 
The meaning of the term ―Sengoku Period‖ 
itself speaks eloquently to the situation in which the 
infantry suddenly found themselves prominent: 
The aggregation of private 
wars…became combined into a 
simple struggle for survival with 
                                                 
5
 Delmer M. Brown, ―The Impact of Firearms on 
Japanese Warfare, 1543-98,‖ The Far Eastern Quarterly 7, 
No. 3 (May, 1948): 244. 
6
 Michael Haskew, Christer Jorgensen, Chris McNab, 
Eric Niderost and Rob S. Rice, Fighting Techniques of the 
Oriental World AD 1200-1860: Equipment, Combat Skills and 
Tactics (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 2008), 164. 
13 
rapidly changing alliances, triumphs 
and disasters, that was to last for 
over a century. Borrowing an 
expression from the Chinese, the 
years for 1490 to 1600 are called the 
‗Sengoku-Jidai,‘ which is best 
translated as ‗the Age of the Country 
at War.‘ It was war on a scale vaster 
and more terrible than Japan had yet 
experienced.
7
 
 
The ―war on a scale vaster and more 
terrible‖ was, by and large, due to infantry 
involvement. The reason is twofold. In 1568, while 
the Sengoku infighting raged in many ways its 
hottest, Japan had a population of a staggering 10 
million people, spread over three main islands.
8
 
These islands were, in turn, covered by mountains, 
with geographically youthful bedrock peaks 
covering 80% of Japan‘s surface. The remaining 
portion was made up primarily of uniformly flat 
                                                 
7
 Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 116.  
8
 Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan, (Berkley, 
California: University of California Press, 1993), 11. 
14 
lowlands, the three largest of which came to house 
the majority of Japan‘s population.9 The 
geographical closeness of the islands translated into 
localized and dense fighting. The plain of 
Kawanakajima, one of the few open plains nestled 
between several mountain ranges and rivers, 
witnessed no less than five battles between 1553 
and 1564, strong testimony to how Japan‘s 
geography influenced its wars.
10
 
 Historically, however, this influence had not 
always held true. In past wars, Japanese armies 
relied on the elite, mounted samurai horse archers 
who would respond quickly to a threat across any 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., 5. 
10
 Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, 
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 269. 
15 
portion of the islands.
11
 The system had evolved out 
of eight and ninth century conflicts with the Emishi, 
the ―barbarians‖ who inhabited northern Japan, 
when their light, mobile and hard hitting cavalry 
wrecked one Japanese expedition after another.
12
 
The tradition was further refined after the Mongol 
invasions of the 1200‘s showed the need for less 
cumbersome armor and the utility of the close-
combat oriented spear or naginata.
13
 With the 
coming of the Sengoku Period, the close, violent 
fighting that resulted would dramatically change the 
way the Japanese looked at war. 
 This closeness, when combined with Japan‘s 
comparatively immense population, turned infantry 
                                                 
11
 Arnold Blumberg, ―Between the 15th and early 17th 
centuries, mounted samurai ruled Japan‘s battlefields,‖ 
Military History 28 (December 2004). 
12
Paul Varley, Warriors of Japan as Portrayed in the 
War Tales (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 3-5. 
13
 Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, 
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 91. 
16 
into a natural and easily available fighting force. 
Daimyo, the feudal Japanese lords whose constant 
and varied bids for power perpetuated the civil war, 
were ever vigilant for ways to gain the upper hand. 
Japan‘s geography and large population made it 
easy to recruit, concentrate, and fight with masses 
of foot soldiers. Initially these ashigaru, literally 
meaning ―light feet‖ because of their tendency to 
loot the battlefields and towns in the manner of 
more modern ―footpads,‖ were almost mercenary in 
nature, fighting for the spoils they could steal and 
having little loyalty, often drifting off to tend crops 
or even to switch sides if the opportunities for 
bounty looked more promising. To compound 
issues, they were almost to a man poorly trained and 
ill-disciplined, making their only real value the 
17 
numbers in which they were available.
14
 By the end 
of the Sengoku Period, these issues would largely 
be solved and the lowly ashigaru would change the 
face of Japanese society, not only by virtue of their 
numbers but of the increasing role of technology in 
warfare. 
 The increases, improvements, and 
innovations made in Japanese warfare technology 
during the Sengoku Period were to have their most 
profound effect on the infantry. Up until this time 
weapons, armor, and technological advances 
associated with war had been reserved exclusively 
for the upper class and mounted samurai who were 
doing the majority of the fighting. With infantry 
rapidly becoming a major factor at the beginning of 
the sixteenth century, it was only logical that those 
                                                 
14
 Stephen Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 84-85. 
18 
advances, and newer ones spurred on by the near 
constant fighting, would be applied to them 
eventually. These technological advances would 
have the effect of not only making infantry more 
and more of a force to be reckoned with on the 
battlefield, but also of instilling a sense of discipline 
and uniformity among the ―ashigaru‖. 
 Perhaps the best example for the creation of 
uniformity and effectiveness among the ranks of 
ashigaru is the evolution of their armor. The first 
ashigaru simply brought whatever armor he owned, 
often none, to the battlefield, and looted what more 
he could take after the battle.
15
 As the century wore 
on and more and more daimyo recognized the 
impact their infantry were having on the battlefield, 
they began to issue them what is known as okashi 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., 85-86. 
19 
gusoku, ―loan armor,‖ which consisted chiefly of a 
breastplate (dô) and a short armored skirt 
(kusazuri).
16
 This armor was fairly cheap and easy 
to make thanks largely to changes brought on by 
heavy campaigning, namely the simplification of 
the lacing that held individual strips of armor 
together. Typical Japanese armor of the time, such 
as the dô, were made from overlapping strips of 
iron, laced tightly together, that would provide 
surprisingly great freedom of movement. As 
demand became higher and campaigns lasted 
longer, the lacing was loosened and more 
strategically placed, making it both cheaper and 
easier to tolerate on the march.
17
 It was the ashigaru 
who benefited most from these changes, as daimyo 
                                                 
16
 Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, 
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 40-41. 
17
 Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 126. 
20 
were more willing and able to provide volunteers 
with suits of the reliable okashi gusoku.  
 While this minute example shows that the 
daimyo were slowly beginning to care enough about 
ashigaru to supply them, for good reason as will be 
discussed later, it also meant that the daimyo 
themselves had more control over the army and the 
individual infantrymen. Armor issued by daimyo 
was uniform in make and color and often had the 
mon, or personal heraldry of the daimyo, painted 
somewhere on it.
18
 Some leaders even went to the 
extreme of having their entire force‘s armor and 
weapons being a uniform color, such as Il 
Naomasa‘s ―Red Devils,‖ who were clad entirely in 
shades of red.
19
 While instances of this extreme are 
uncommon, the uniformity of the issued armor 
                                                 
18
 Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 86. 
19
 Turnbull, The Samurai Sourcebook , 44. 
21 
worked to unify and identify the army on the 
battlefield. Armor played a key role in helping to 
change the ashigaru from a scarcely armed rabble 
to a uniform and identifiable fighting force, helping 
to bring it together under the control of the daimyo.  
 The weapons of the ashigaru played a very 
similar, but much more visible, role in establishing 
discipline and making them a deadly force on the 
battlefield. Often simple technological innovations 
and regulations in weaponry had a massive 
battlefield and social impact. For example, the yumi, 
or the Japanese bow. Originally a weapon of the 
elite samurai, horse archers par excellence even into 
the Sengoku Period, the bow gradually found its 
way into the hands the infantry for a variety of 
reasons. Bitter military defeats in the Mongol 
invasions had taught the Japanese the power of 
22 
massed bow-fire, where many hundreds of arrows 
launched were more effective than single, well 
aimed ones.
20
 This factor had been taken into 
account before the Age of Warring States and the 
first mention of ashigaru in Japanese history comes 
out of the battles during the Nanbokuchō Wars in 
the 14
th
 century, where hundreds of shashu no 
ashigaru, ―infantry shooters,‖ were employed.21 
With the infantry becoming more numerous on the 
battlefields of the Sengoku Period, it was only a 
small step in logic to arm them with bows to 
achieve powerful massed volleys. 
 It was these volleys that the yumi excelled at 
delivering. Though it was initially a weapon of the 
samurai, the bow was fairly easy to make and 
                                                 
20
 Blumberg, ―Between the 15th and early 17th 
centuries, mounted samurai ruled Japan‘s battlefields,‖ 78. 
21
 Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 84. 
23 
powerful, consisting of a strip of hardwood between 
two strips of bamboo, held together and treated with 
glue and a close binding.
22
 This layered 
construction made them individually powerful 
weapons, comparable to European longbows, and 
were augmented by a staggering variety of arrows 
made for any situation, from cutting armor to 
emitting a shrill whistling noise used for signaling 
and intimidation.
23
 Additionally, bows helped instill 
discipline in the ashigaru due to the amount of skill 
required to be an archer. Ashigaru chosen or 
volunteering to be archers would necessarily 
undergo periods of training, or help train other 
ashigaru, which would give them a previously 
unheard of amount of professionalism, a trend that 
                                                 
22
 Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, 
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 50. 
23
 Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 22. 
24 
continued in the use of the arquebus. Putting bows 
in the hands of the ashigaru also had the profound 
effect of breaking down varying social boundaries. 
After all, the bow had traditionally been the 
exclusive province of the mounted samurai and 
giving a weapon with such distinguished 
connotations to the lower class is one prime 
example as to how the battlefield was changing the 
way the Japanese viewed their society.  
 Another important weapon in the 
development of the ashigaru was the spear. 
Consistently overlooked, not only in Japanese 
military history, in favor gunpowder weapons and 
flashier developments, the simple nagae yari had an 
equally large impact on the use of infantry. For one, 
it was cheaper and easier to use than almost any 
other weapon, ideal for quickly arming large bodies 
25 
of men. And, above every other weapon, the spear 
favors larger numbers of troops with little training, 
as the basic use of the weapon is abundantly clear: 
stick the sharp end into the enemy. As a result, most 
Sengoku Period armies had a large percentage of 
spearmen in their ranks, often as high as 70%.
24
 
Armies of the Hōjō clan, who controlled the 
powerful Kantō region, had spearmen regularly 
make up 50% of their armies and Oda Nobunaga, 
the first great unifier, led forces that comprised of at 
least 27%.
25
 
These two factors made spears integral to 
the success not only of ashigaru, but to the daimyo 
who led them. While in its basic conception the 
spear is an easy weapon to use, spears favor their 
                                                 
24
 Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, 
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 42. 
25
 Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 103. 
26 
wielders working in close formation and the 
introduction of drill and discipline to the ranks of 
spearmen in this regard would increase their 
battlefield effectiveness many times over. The 
Zōhyō Monogatari, a guide to infantry tactics 
penned in 1649 by prominent samurai Matsudaira 
Nobuoki, says of the ashigaru spearmen: 
Unlike samurai spearmen, where 
spears are thought of as only for 
single combat, here many are of one 
mind, with spear points moving 
together, keeping a rhythm. When 
one or two meet it is find to fight 
individually, but when spears are 
used en masse there must be 
coordination and timing, with no 
exception.
26
 
 
                                                 
26
 ―Zōhyō Monogatari,” in Turnbull, The Samurai 
Sourcebook , 184. Note that the year, 1649, is almost half a 
century after the end of Sengoku Jidai. The author is in a 
unique position of observing the final outcome of Sengoku 
Period ashigaru tactics and integration, yet the only real 
firsthand experience he may have had would be helping put 
down the Shimabara Rebellion a decade prior in 1638. 
27 
 The fact that such a section was written 
about spear drill and tactics after the Sengoku 
Period speaks well to their developing effectiveness 
during it. It should come as no surprise to find that 
the first daimyo to introduce truly disciplined spear 
units was Oda Nobunaga, who relied greatly on 
them in most of his engagements and especially at 
Nagashino, a battle more known for his use of the 
arquebus.
27
 He made his spears uniformly longer 
than any of his opponents (5.6 meters), a detail that, 
when combined with his spearmen‘s superior 
discipline, made his cheaply outfitted ashigaru a 
true menace on the battlefield. This success set the 
precedent for spear length becoming a major factor, 
so much so that when the daimyo Hōjō Ujimasa 
mustered hastily to defend his domain from 
                                                 
27
 Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 103. 
28 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Nobunaga‘s successor, he 
would decree ―a spear…is useless if it is shorter 
than two ken (twelve feet).‖28 
Yet the weapon to produce the most visible 
and sweeping changes to infantry warfare was to be 
the arquebus, an early handgun introduced by the 
Portuguese during the Sengoku Period. Unlike the 
bow and spear the arquebus had a host of initial 
problems to contend with; the ammunition and 
black powder it used could not yet be easily mass 
produced and it had a cripplingly short range and 
slow rate of fire compared to its yumi counterpart.
29
 
However, the tremendous power of the arquebus, 
                                                 
28
 ―Compulsory Military Service Decreed by Hōjō 
Ujimasa, 1587,‖ in David J. Lu, ―From Civil Wars to 
Unification,‖ in Japan: A Documentary History, 171-201 
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 186. 
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commonly called a matchlock because of its system 
of firing, outweighed these disadvantages. It fired 
an 8mm caliber bullet, which could easily punch 
through even the best made suit of armor, instantly 
killing or maiming the wearer who would normally 
be almost immune to bow fire.
30
 Such weakness 
could also be mitigated by mixing bowmen into the 
arquebus formations. Most often appearing in a 
ratio of five archers to ten gunners, bowmen could 
shoot faster than their cumbersomely armed 
companions and thus maintain, to a reasonable 
degree, the rate of fire of the handgun formation 
while the arqubuses were bring reloaded. This 
combination had become so effective and such 
standard practice by the end of the Sengoku Period 
that this integration was recommended in the Zōhyō 
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Monogatari, the previously mentioned guide to 
using ashigaru.
31
 Given the power of the 
matchlock, the means available to limit its 
weaknesses, and its sheer efficacy, it is no surprise 
that a general writing back to his province 
requesting reinforcements during Hideyoshi‘s 
invasion of Korea asked to ―have them bring as 
many guns as possible, for no other equipment is 
needed. Give strict orders that all men, even 
samurai, carry guns.‖32 
The arquebus had one key feature above its 
ability to turn men quickly into soldiers through 
ease of use and constant drill, in that it was usable 
almost exclusively by infantry. With its lengthy 
loading procedure, awkward size, and tremendous 
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recoil, the matchlock was not a weapon for the 
mounted soldier. Thus, in order to take full 
advantage of the potential of these weapons, as 
many daimyo attempted to do, they had to rely on 
infantry as their handgun arm. Given the large 
proportion of infantry already in daimyo armies, 
finding these men posed no significant problem, so 
it was to the ashigaru that the matchlock conferred 
its powerful battlefield advantages. It was 
universally easier to use than a bow, which required 
much practice and a large amount of natural skill to 
fire accurately. Loading and firing a matchlock 
could be taught in a day and steady drill could turn 
men into professionals in the course of one 
campaign season. Better yet, there was almost no 
―skill,‖ per se, involved; the procedure was simply a 
series of steps to push shot down the barrel, fill the 
32 
pan with powder, and light the match to fire it, 
presumably in the direction of the enemy. The need 
for this constant drill also provided an easy means 
to turn a rabble of unskilled men into a standing 
army, working in tandem with the okashi gusoku 
loan armor to instill in the previously footloose men 
a sense of unit pride and an incentive to stay. 
Despite its disadvantage of being expensive 
and more difficult to produce, the arquebus began to 
be fielded in increasing numbers, adding to their 
effectiveness and slowly transforming Sengoku 
Period fighting. Battles began to become large scale 
maneuvers of infantry units rather than mad dashes 
into the enemy line for a chance at glory. The nature 
of the handgun and its battlefield use, concentrated 
volleys using multiple lines of gunners to try and 
keep up a steady fire, led the way in the concept and 
33 
eventual creation of units of infantry, and even 
cavalry.
33
 Soldiers would be grouped in large 
formations depending on which sort of weapon they 
held - bow, spear or arquebus - and used on the 
battlefield in groups to try and gain a tactical 
advantage. Perhaps no battle demonstrates this 
tactic better than the one that propelled Oda 
Nobunaga, the first of the great unifiers, to national 
prominence: Nagashino. 
The Battle of Nagashino itself is mostly 
represented in history books, films, and art prints as 
the slaughter of masses of samurai cavalry by the 
humble but powerful arquebus. While the arquebus 
certainly had a major role to play in the battle, 
examination of the details reveal that it is more Oda 
Nobunaga‘s consummate use of combined arms and 
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dependence on infantry that won the day. 
Nagashino was at once both a battle and a siege, 
fought in 1575 outside the fortress of Nagashino 
which the invading army of Takeda Katsuyori was 
attempting to wrestle from the neighboring 
Tokugawa control. Katsuyori was the son and heir 
to the more famous Takeda Shingen, who was a 
well known and much feared commander of 
cavalry, of which he possessed a large amount, 
especially during the infantry-conscious Sengoku 
Jidai. He would pass both his skills as a leader and 
his imperial ambitions onto his son, who, during the 
Nagashino campaign, attempted to fulfill his 
father‘s dream of capturing Kyoto. To do so he had 
to go through the territories of Tokugawa Ieyasu, 
the later shogun, and Oda Nobunaga, with whom he 
had established a firm and mutually beneficial 
35 
alliance in the recent years. When Nagashino, a key 
fortress in the Tokugawa interior, came under siege, 
a desperate series of actions brought both the main 
army of Ieyasu and a large relief force from 
Nobunaga.
34
  
The battle was set up along a series of 
marshy and rolling ridges just out of sight of the 
fortress of Nagashino, which was then under attack. 
Katsuyori, upon hearing of the relief forces heading 
towards the castle, decided to meet them in open 
battle in order to use his cavalry, superior in both 
training and numbers, most effectively. Nobunaga, 
whose army made up the bulk of the relief force, 
anticipated this move and drew up his army, 
predominately infantry, accordingly.
35
 He knew the 
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strength of handguns, having fought against them in 
the hands of Buddhist monks and local alliances 
known as ikki, and he planned to use these weapons 
to their full potential.
36
  
To help guard against Katsuyori‘s fearsome 
cavalry, he created a running line of palisades 
behind which he placed his and Ieyasu‘s 3,000 
gunners. Each palisade intentionally fronted rough 
terrain and was broken periodically every few 
hundred feet, creating natural points of attack for 
Katsuyori and an easy corridor of counterattack for 
himself. As another precaution, and a sign of just 
how much value he put on the arquebus troops, he 
had his personal bodyguard, the most elite samurai 
in the army, dismount and take control of the 
separate matchlock units. This move not only 
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strengthened the line, but gave the ashigaru an 
enormous shot of discipline, making sure they 
would keep courageous and steady. Behind this odd 
mix of troops he held his spearmen and many 
dismounted samurai to support or counter any 
significant breakthrough Katsuyori might achieve.
37
 
With these preparations made, he awaited the 
Takeda onslaught. 
At six o‘clock on the morning of June 28th, 
Katsuyori dutifully gave the order to charge against 
Nobunaga‘s line. The action was not as idiotic as it 
sounds. The Takeda had four samurai to every three 
of Nobunaga‘s gunners and though he was well 
aware of the power of the handgun, having seen his 
father use them in numerous siege operations, he 
was counting on a rainstorm the night before to 
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have rendered the powder and matches used for 
firing them useless. Even if they had not been 
turned into metal-augmented firewood by the 
downpour, they would only be able to get off one 
shot before his faster and more skilled mounted 
samurai were on top of them. So that morning, 
4,500 horsemen charged into the teeth of 
Nobunaga‘s arquebuses.38 
This charge was exactly what Nobunaga had 
been expecting and, to a degree, hoping for. In 
preparation, he had lined his gunners three ranks 
deep, so once the first rank had discharged their 
weapon, the second could step forwards and do so, 
then step back and let the third do the same. By the 
time the third rank had pulled the trigger, the first 
rank would ideally have reloaded and would be 
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ready to fire again. Nobunga had used this trick 
before, with success, but had never implemented it 
on such a scale. As it stood the tactic had the 
desired effect, the ashigaru having kept their 
powder and matches dry, and all Katsuyori could do 
was watch in horror as three volleys in a previously 
unbelievable succession tore his samurai apart. As 
the morning progressed, however, the Takeda 
managed to get to grips with Nobunaga‘s army, 
especially once Katsuyori committed his infantry 
and reserves, including his own personal guard. 
Nobunaga‘s right flank in particular, which was not 
protected by the palisade or any form of fence, 
became the scene of close and bloody hand-to-hand 
combat.
39
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Hours later, Nobunaga gave the signal to fall 
back to a second line of fences prepared at the same 
time as the main palisades. Once disengaged, 
Katsuyori began to move his army back to regroup 
and possibly consider retreating. Nobunaga did not 
give him a chance. Once it was clear the Takeda 
were falling back, he had his samurai mount and 
give pursuit, wreaking havoc on Katsuyori‘s 
disorganized army. While Katsuyori and most of his 
high command escaped, it became obvious by 
nightfall that Nobunaga had carried the day. The 
Takeda withdrew back into their home province.
40
 
In light of such a brief description, it is easy 
to see the temptation of writing Nagashino off as 
being won solely by the use of firearms. As 
mentioned before, an examination of the details 
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reveals Nobunaga‘s genius in the use of combined 
arms tactics and his recognition of the power of 
infantry. If Nagashino had truly been a battle won 
by firepower mowing down cavalry, it would not 
have had several of the key features it did, such as 
its grueling length, over eight hours, or any 
prearranged fall back action by Nobunaga. Notably, 
much of the decisive damage from a strategic 
standpoint was done not by the gunners in the 
opening hours, but by the mounted samurai and the 
light-footed ashigaru during the twilight as they 
systematically destroyed the Takeda rearguard and 
large formations of panicked troops.
41
 
If it was not the use of firearms that decided 
the battle, then it was unquestionably Nobunaga‘s 
previously stated genius at combined arms and 
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dependence on infantry. Nobunaga was wise 
enough to take into consideration most, if not all, of 
the factors previously discussed in relation to 
weaponry and dominance of infantry. He made sure 
that his men were armed correctly and superiorly, 
and also made sure there were more of them than 
the enemy. Nobunaga‘s force on its own, 
disregarding his Tokugawa allies, numbered 30,000 
men, twice that of Katsuyori‘s army.42 
Tactically, he took full advantage of the 
infantry‘s capabilities and newfound flexibility. 
Homogenization of units by weapon types allowed 
him to deploy a strong front of purely arquebus 
troops, supported by units more suited for close 
combat, such as his well disciplined, effective, and 
numerous ashigaru spearmen. Indeed, it was in 
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these spearmen where a large portion of his 
advantage lay. Accepting the fact that the Takeda 
cavalry would probably reach his lines despite his 
innovative use of handguns, he set up his line of 
battle to give him an advantage wherever they broke 
through. By creating gaps in a staggered line of 
palisades, he effectively directed the focal point of 
the Takeda charge, right into the waiting spear ends 
of his ashigaru.  
The flexibility and ease of control 
specialization offered also allowed him to pull back, 
replace, and redeploy units quickly, a characteristic 
that proved invaluable when the samurai did 
manage to force a hole in the line. Enemy cavalry 
under Obata Masamori did at one point manage to 
breach the line of palisades during a lull in the 
firing, only to be bloodily repulsed as the gunners 
44 
fell back to make room for the spearmen and 
dismounted samurai to come up.
43
 Numerous other 
breakthroughs were also repelled by the ability of 
Nobunaga to set up a flank assault on the breaching 
forces, thanks to the deadly combination of 
ashigaru discipline, unit continuity, and the 
staggered line of palisades. At the end of the day, 
this flexibility also proved decisive as Nobunaga 
was able to react almost instantly to the retreating 
Takeda army, the disciplined and homogonous 
makeup of the units allowing him to keep them 
together and, in some instances, turn them on the 
spot to pursue the enemy. He also successfully 
employed his mounted samurai at this point, 
unleashing speed, martial prowess, and hunger for 
glory at just the right moment to make an impact. 
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Nagashino is an excellent example of how 
Nobunga‘s military power and political dominance 
was derived from the infantry. With this newfound 
emphasis on the ashigaru, the samurai suddenly 
found themselves in a clumsy situation, one that 
they would need to adapt to in order to survive. 
Their inferiors were beginning to take over their 
previous role, that of the protector and warrior of 
Japan, and their superiors, their daimyo lords, were 
beginning to strengthen their control over the 
battlefield. The samurai, while the elite, were no 
longer the sole arbiters on the field of battle. The 
technological edge, discipline, and sheer numbers of 
the ashigaru combined to reduce the mounted 
samurai from the dominant military force to a mere 
officer class over the course of the Sengoku Period, 
diluting their claims to prestige and allowing the 
46 
daimyo to control and benefit from war. The 
samurai were forced into their new role by both 
sides of the social scale, each side deriving its 
power directly from the newfound dominance of the 
infantry. From the bottom, smaller local samurai 
would be able to gain power and retainers, unit 
commanders, and even ashigaru would be able to 
ascend the social ladder, redefining the role of the 
samurai class as a whole. From the top, the need for 
centralized control to use the power of the infantry 
would give the daimyo unprecedented control over 
the samurai, allowing these local lords, rather than 
the warrior ideal of Japan, to take the proverbial 
reins of Japan‘s future. 
Samurai, especially during Sengoku, was by 
no means a definite term. While it is typically, and 
ideally, used to describe Japan‘s mounted archer 
47 
elite who were responsible for defending the island 
and winning personal glory on the battlefield, it 
could describe any man from those who met this 
ideal down to a simple village headmen, whose only 
similarity to their heroic brethren was that they 
served the same lord and could be called on for 
military service. These lower samurai, called 
village samurai or ji-samurai, would find 
themselves in positions of unexpected power and 
influence during the Sengoku Period.
44
 As de facto 
leaders in their community due to their status and 
comparative wealth, they became an important link 
from the daimyo to the village, where most of the 
recruits for infantry service were drawn from. In 
return for their services mustering and organizing 
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recruits the ji-samurai were in an ideal position not 
only to lead on the battlefield, but to demand 
privilege from their superiors in return for their 
services.
45
  
Thus, many of these lower samurai rose 
rapidly in military rank and wealth, expanding the 
ideas and sensibilities of the samurai class as a 
whole. Not only did they very visibly lack horses, 
an essential ingredient for the ideal samurai, but 
they could be employed as unit leaders, whose role 
was not to charge onto the field in search of glory, 
but to stay with their men to coordinate them with 
other units on the battlefield, interpret orders from 
the daimyo, and ensure that they were kept under 
control. Privilege and ascension in the samurai class 
did not have to take the form of battlefield glory, or 
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even anything to do with war. Often times the 
rewards of the ji-samurai would be land, money, or 
simply more duties to attend to. There was also the 
distinct possibility of being promoted to a daimyo‘s 
household or personal staff and retainers, great 
honors not necessarily involving military duty. This 
mobility started to distort the image of what a 
samurai truly was, by having increasing numbers of 
rising samurai occupying administrative or practical 
jobs not necessarily on the battlefield or in pursuit 
of personal honor. All these factors began to 
change, from the bottom up, the way the samurai 
functioned on the battlefield and, as a social group, 
gave a new meaning to what it meant to be a 
samurai. 
In addition, promotion to the samurai rank 
was not unheard of. Skilled or brave unit leaders, 
50 
especially those of higher rank such as ashigaru 
kashira (captain of ashigaru), had the very real 
means to be promoted to samurai. This new status 
was often designated by taking a surname and the 
number of surnamed ashigaru kashira and ashigaru 
ko gashira on many, particularly late, Sengoku 
Period muster rolls and casualty lists indicates that 
this practice, while perhaps exceptional, was far 
from rare.
46
 These newer samurai would have much 
the same effect as the ji-samurai on the definition of 
the samurai class as a whole. With different 
responsibilities, skills, and levels of wealth, the 
newly promoted samurai would change the very 
definition of the word. Samurai were no longer the 
heroic ideal, charging out to meet the foe in 
personal combat, relying on the bow and spear. 
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They were now to be an officer class, a social rather 
than warrior elite who helped the daimyo campaign 
and command in battle, not win it on the strength of 
their own arms. Nobunaga displayed at least a 
temporary awareness of this fact at Nagashino, 
notably when he appointed members of his own 
bodyguard to command the arquebus gunners on the 
front line. These samurai were, most likely to their 
frustration, denied the opportunity to gain personal 
glory or charge into the enemy, but in turn ruled the 
ashigaru with an iron fist, keeping them disciplined, 
steady and most importantly, close together, making 
it easier to withstand the Takeda cavalry charge. 
If the role of the samurai was being 
squeezed and adapted from below by those rising 
through the ranks, then it was also being redefined 
from above, in some instances with no pretext of 
52 
subtlety. This change came from the daimyo, the 
lords whom the samurai served and were ostensibly 
loyal to, and who were now making the most of the 
Sengoku Period turmoil to improve their position. 
Technically, they were samurai in and of 
themselves as the shogunate was a military regime 
and thus its officials were all of military rank, and 
their official title of shugo-daimyo reflected this. 
Historically, they exercised very little actual control 
over battlefield events and acted more as a military 
governor of their province, seeing that civil affairs 
were carried out while the samurai warriors sought 
renown on the battlefield.
47
 This idea began to 
change with the onset of Sengoku Jidai, as daimyo 
began to have a more invested interest in battlefield 
happenings as the course of one battle could see 
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them forced out of office, overthrown by retainers, 
or suddenly propelled into prominence. Daimyo 
thus began to exercise more control over individual 
battles and the samurai below them though several 
different means, almost all of which have their roots 
in the predominance of the ashigaru. 
Battles between samurai armies have often 
been compared to battles in medieval Europe, where 
the paradigm of a knight and his retainers on the 
battlefield reigned supreme. Perhaps a more fitting 
comparison is between the samurai and the 
Homeric heroes of the Trojan War. Combat for 
samurai was much more of a ritualized, individual 
affair than a knightly charge, and the retainers and 
rabble of infantry would, at the onset of a battle, 
demurely keep back and let the two individual 
54 
heroes fight it out for supremacy.
48
 This kind of 
ritualized single combat is devoid of central control, 
or indeed any real scheme for winning the battle, 
making it difficult for a daimyo, with his renewed 
interest in the fighting, to exert influence. The shift 
of battlefield dominance to the infantry changed 
this. As noted before, infantry armies were large 
and worked best when segregated based on 
weaponry, in effect creating different ―branches‖ of 
the army and different units within those branches, 
all of which needed some sort of central 
coordination to work effectively. Samurai, with 
their individualized combat routines and emphasis 
on personal heroism, were in no position to take that 
role. The daimyo, already nominally the head of 
                                                 
48
 William Wayne Farris, Heavenly Warriors: The 
Evolution of Japan’s Military, 500-1300 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 298. 
55 
state and the one man of power presumably more 
interested in winning effectively than being first 
into battle, was in an ideal position to assume the 
mantle of command. The infantry, in effect, created 
a need for centralized command and control, one 
that allowed the daimyo, or anyone who felt like 
seizing the title, to benefit greatly. 
Once this basic relationship was established, 
the daimyo could take steps to not only increase 
their power, but also to rein in the samurai both 
politically and militarily. With the coming of larger 
and larger armies, one method of control adopted by 
the daimyo was that of battlefield formations. While 
they continued to evolve throughout the Sengoku 
Period, the formations were almost universally 
based on old Chinese concepts, with modification 
for some distinctly Japanese features, such as the 
56 
large body of arquebus troops.
49
 Two things are 
exceptional about the battle formations: the 
integration of infantry and the way in which they 
facilitated centralized coordination. The first is 
notable because battle formations were rarely 
cavalry-centric and made good use of the 
specialization, a feature almost exclusive to 
infantry, to work and win the day. For example, the 
koyaku (yoke) formation puts up a strong frontage 
of gunners and archers supported by spearmen, with 
a large force of dismounted samurai in an arrow 
shaped reserve.
50
 The placement and overlap of 
these units allowed them to provide mutual support, 
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something only possible with the advent of the 
specialized infantry unit.  
The way in which they facilitated 
centralized coordination is most important when the 
daimyo‘s ability to control the battlefield is taken 
into account. Not only did having every man in a set 
place make setting up and executing predefined 
maneuvers infinitely easier, but the amount of drill 
and discipline that goes into being able to make 
such formations work helps to turn the previously 
footloose ashigaru into a loyal fighting force.
51
 It 
also allowed for a good deal of battlefield control 
over the samurai, who have been organized into 
specialized units and made to follow orders, even if 
it goes against their ideals. In the case of the koyaku 
especially, the samurai are held in reserve and not 
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in front of the formation, the place where any self-
respecting and competitive samurai hero should be! 
This centralized power the infantry gave to 
the daimyo also began to manifest itself in the 
socio-political areas of Japanese life. Daimyo began 
to exercise stricter control in the form of ―house 
codes‖ and ―house precepts‖ aimed at governing 
their domains, populace, and especially samurai. 
Many of the articles in the codes are aimed 
particularly at demolishing samurai battlefield 
independence and putting them in a subordinate and 
contained role. For example, Article 26 of the Yūki 
House Code: 
Article 26: Wherever it may be to, you must 
not gallop forth as a lone rider without 
receiving orders from the Yūki. But when 
59 
summoned by the Yūki, you must not be 
tardy.
52
  
 
Or, even more strongly worded, Articles 67 and 72: 
Article 67: To gallop forth 
heedlessly and without thought 
because you hear the sound of the 
conch shell from the main fort that 
signals taking to the field is quite 
unpardonable. If the shell sounds, 
you should go to a village and 
quickly dispatch some underling or 
servant to the main fort and have him 
inquire into where you should go. 
Only then should you gallop forth… 
Article 72: Men of the horse units 
should obviously not join an outside 
group, nor should they join a 
different group within the Yūki 
house…The horse units should 
always act in conjunction with ten or 
twenty other riders and not mingle 
with other groups.
53
 
The daimyo here mean to rein in as best they 
can the battle-eager samurai. Notice especially the 
discouragement of riding out alone and the 
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emphasis on staying within a unit. Both these 
concepts helped the daimyo to exercise more 
control over their subjects, who had previously been 
dominant in the arts and strategy of war and may 
not take kindly to being simply ordered into 
formation. Using the ideas of honor that underlay 
almost all codes created by feudal lords and the 
samurai‘s strong virtue and ideal of loyalty, the 
daimyo began to fundamentally change the 
definition of the samurai class from above, even as 
they sought greater control and power for 
themselves. Just as they elevated ji-samurai and 
unit commanders to dilute the image of the warrior 
class, so to they also compressed them into elite 
fighting units or put them in commands subordinate 
to themselves on the battlefield. Being a samurai 
during Sengoku Japan slowly began to mean being 
61 
a member of the officer caste, one who was above 
the foot soldiers and other members of the same 
class, but who was ultimately subordinate to the 
daimyo and certainly not in charge of his own 
individual actions or glory on the battlefield. 
It is worth reiterating that this power exerted 
by the daimyo over the samurai was made possible 
by the need for centralized control created by the 
numbers, specialization, and increasing 
professionalism of the infantry. The most prominent 
and powerful daimyo did not construct their power 
around a large base of mounted samurai supporters; 
they instead made sure that their infantry were well 
supplied, numerous, and under their direct control. 
Oda Nobunaga, a man of previously recognized 
military capacity, invested his money at the outset 
of the military campaign season of 1549 not in 
62 
samurai katana and horses, but in 500 matchlock 
guns with which to equip his infantry.
54
 House 
codes, in addition to keeping a tight hold on the 
samurai, supported the arming of multiple 
infantrymen over a single samurai, such as in the 
famous article from Asakura Toshikage: 
4. Do not excessively covet swords 
made by famous masters. Even if 
you own a sword or dagger worth 
10,000 pieces, it can be overcome by 
100 spears each worth 100 pieces. 
Therefore, use the 10,000 pieces to 
procure 100 spears, and arm 100 
men with them. You can in this 
manner defend yourself in time of 
war.
55
 
 
While this code was written early in the 
Sengoku Period, it demonstrates that at least some 
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daimyo grasped the importance of the ashigaru over 
mounted samurai in maintaining their power. Once 
the correlation between the infantryman and the 
newfound military influence of the daimyo was 
fully comprehended, they understandably took 
measures to secure and solidify it. One previously 
discussed method was through armor, the okashi 
gusoku, ―loan armor,‖ which they could use to 
standardize the quality and appearance of their 
army. Another notable way of doing so, that also 
conveniently undermined traditional samurai 
power, was of direct recruitment of ashigaru from 
the villages. Traditionally, samurai had been 
required to bring men from the area which they 
ruled, who were then loosely organized and 
employed. By going straight to the source, so to 
speak, the daimyo cut the samurai middleman out 
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of the picture and increased his own influence over 
the infantry units.
56
 This practice also had the side-
effect of increasing the importance of the ji-samurai 
as mentioned earlier who, as a result of interest in 
recruitment from their villages, had more contact 
and political clout with their daimyo lords. 
The man who perhaps best understood this 
correlation and took the most dramatic steps to 
protect it was Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the second great 
unifier of Japan himself. Having come to power 
after the death of Nobunaga, he proceeded during 
the later decades of the 16
th
 century to unify all of 
Japan under his control through a series of military 
and social maneuvers that rivaled Nobunaga‘s in 
mastery. Even before he had conquered the entire 
island, he refined and created an efficient standing 
                                                 
56
 Birt, ―Samurai in Passage,‖ 378-379. 
65 
army, which depended almost solely on him for its 
supplies, arms, and equipment. He managed this 
task by setting up centralized government storage 
systems and military contracts, which made 
virtually all those under his command rely on his 
will in order to conduct military operations.
57
 
His masterstrokes in securing power came, 
however, in 1588 and 1591, when he issued two 
separate, but mutually supportive, edicts that 
changed the structure of Japan for well over two 
and half centuries. 1588 saw the implementation of 
the infamous ―Sword Hunt‖ Edict, which made it 
forbidden for farmers ―to have in their possession 
any swords, short swords, bows, spears, firearms, or 
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other types of weapons.‖58 The weapons collected 
from this mass confiscation ostensibly went to the 
creation of a gigantic statue of Buddha, but most 
probably went into state armories to prepare for the 
invasion of Korea launched in 1592.
59
 In one stroke, 
Hideyoshi had essentially created a military class in 
Japan. By disarming the farmers and commoners, 
the only weapons left in the state were those 
wielded by the soldiers in the standing armies, 
which included previously recruited ashigaru. In 
1591, the class realities that had developed because 
of the Sword Hunt were solidified in law when 
Hideyoshi issued the Separation Edict, which 
decreed that any man attempting to leave his social 
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class would be ―punished accordingly‖ and his 
village or master could be ―regarded as committing 
a culpable offense.‖60 By creating punishments for 
leaving one‘s station in life, warrior, farmer, 
commoner, or merchant, Hideyoshi in effect created 
a government enforced class system, one that would 
have huge ramifications for the ashigaru and the 
samurai. 
Since ashigaru were now locked into the 
military, they officially formed a lower class of 
samurai. Hideyoshi‘s edict had simply legalized 
and solidified the system that had already been 
developed: the assimilation of the ashigaru and, to a 
degree, daimyo into the samurai class and the 
accompanying redefinition. The term ―samurai‖ 
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now referred essentially to any fighting man rather 
than the heroic ideal. What had developed 
throughout the Sengoku Period was essentially a 
larger warrior class with very real social mobility; 
ashigaru could become unit leaders, unit leaders 
could become samurai, and samurai could become 
anything from the lord of a local province to a 
daimyo. Having risen from the ranks himself, 
though never having quite attained the samurai 
class, Hideyoshi must have been fully aware of the 
system that was developing and simply took the 
dramatic step to implement it on a legal and 
national level in order to protect his own power. He 
would have little to worry about from upstart 
samurai now that they had officially become an 
officer class and only had the power to move up or 
down in the system, rather than out through 
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demonstrations of personal prowess on the 
battlefield. Hideyoshi‘s rise and the power system 
he left in place for the Tokugawa shoguns was 
engendered and supported by the rising star of the 
ashigaru footman. It simply took a leader, or 
multiple leaders, who knew how to use them and 
who recognized their power to truly change the face 
of Japan. 
St. Francis Xavier‘s simplistic observation 
of them in 1550 was perhaps truer than any concept 
the Japanese had of their own warriors at the time: 
―They are excellent archers and fight on foot, 
although there are horses in the country.‖61 As a 
foreigner observing the warfare of Sengoku Jidai, 
he picked up on two things quickly: the martial skill 
                                                 
61
 ―St. Francis Xavier‘s View of Japanese, c. 1550,‖ 
in David J. Lu, ―From Civil Wars to Unification,‖ in Japan: A 
Documentary History, 171-201 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 
198. 
70 
of the Japanese and the prevalence of the ashigaru. 
The use of horses is casually dismissed, something 
it would take a great man of Japan another twenty 
five years to even consider doing. Yet such a simple 
observation cuts to the heart of it. It was the 
infantryman, the lowly light-foot, who had the 
power to change Japan. Geography and technology 
conspired to put it into his hands and allowed able 
leaders such as Oda Nobunaga to win decisive 
victories with ingenious tactics. That same power 
was lent to Toyotomi Hideyoshi who would bring to 
a head all the change that had been over a century in 
the making and would redefined not only what it 
meant to be a samurai, but what it meant to be a 
warrior in medieval Japan. As Asakura Sōteki wrote 
in his house precepts ―call the warrior a dog, call 
him a beast: winning is his business,‖ an attitude 
71 
that would shape Japan and give the ashigaru the 
necessary influence to do so.
62
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This House which I have built: The 
Foundation of the Brattle Street Church in 
Boston and Transformations in Colonial 
Congregationalism 
Cara Elliott 
 
―Their high object was to found a new Christian 
Congregational church, upon the broad, catholic, 
but conservative principles of Congregationalism – 
a church in which a just liberty and privilege should 
be allowed to all, and nothing imposed on any 
individual.‖ 1 
 
On December 24, 1699, a small gathering of 
men and women met ―for public Worship in [their] 
pleasant new-built house,‖ a simple wooden 
structure in Brattle Close, a section of Boston near 
the town dock.
2
 The newly appointed Reverend 
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 Samuel Kirkland Lothrop, ―Sermon One, December 
30, 1849,‖ A History of the Church in Brattle Street, Boston 
(Boston: WM. Crosby and H.P. Nichols, 1851), 16.  
2
 Benjamin Colman, ―Records of the Church in 
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Benjamin Colman preached from Chronicles 2, 
chapter vi, verse 18, ―But will God in very deed 
dwell with men on the earth? Behold, heaven, and 
the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee; how 
much less this house which I have built.‖3 This first 
public meeting of the Brattle Street Church 
occurred amidst a heated theological debate among 
New England Congregational clergymen, which 
began a year earlier when the foundation of the 
church had first been conceived. Brattle Street‘s 
foundation was in reaction to theological, political, 
and cultural transformations that affected the whole 
of New England in the latter half of the seventeenth 
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century, all of which converged in the 1690s. While 
the foundation of Brattle Street Church did not 
make any radical departures from contemporary 
theological consensus, its foundation did represent 
the first concrete fragmentation of a theretofore 
unified New England Congregational community.
4
  
In this sense, the foundation of the Brattle Street 
Church is representative of a radical development in 
the evolution of colonial Congregationalism.  
 Brattle Street Church‘s foundation was not a 
random occurrence. There were a number of 
developments that caused its founders to establish a 
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Architect in the Transition of the New England Mind, 1690-
1700,‖ Winterthur Portfolio 24, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 237 and 
241 suggests that the ―liberalism‖ of the Brattle Street 
founders, namely the mathematician-merchant Thomas 
Brattle, has been exaggerated by the historical community. 
This assertion is correct when viewing the founders from a 
strictly theological or philosophical perspective. However, it 
oversimplifies the contemporary contextualization of the 
church‘s foundation.  
 75 
new congregation, beginning with the 
Congregational Synod of 1662 and the adoption of 
the ―Half-Way‖ covenant. The decision was made 
in hopes of reversing flagging church membership 
and loss of piety characteristic of the 1650s, in 
which the church saw the Congregational Way – 
John Winthrop‘s original ―City upon a Hill‖ church-
state observing the sovereign law of Sola Scriptura, 
or scripture alone, – slipping through their fingers.5 
As Patricia Bonomi notes, the clergy ―ever wary of 
complacency, were prepared to reform church 
practices . . . in ways that would command the 
continuing allegiance of New Englanders to the 
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Congregational Way.‖6 First suggested by Richard 
Mather, a prominent Puritan clergyman at this time, 
the covenant extended ―Half-Way‖ membership to 
children whose parents were only ―outward‖ church 
members baptized by the church. These parents had 
not experienced the conversion moment followed 
by the ―publick relation of experience‖ of that 
conversion to the rest of the congregation – the 
requirement for church members to become full 
communicants in the Lord‘s Supper. The Half-Way 
covenant stipulated that the children of these 
baptized yet un-converted men and women could 
also be baptized, a privilege previously reserved for 
full members‘ children. In return, the parents were 
to recognize the historical preeminence of the 
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 Patricia Bonomi, Under the Cope of Heaven: 
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church‘s faith and to promise to live according to 
God‘s word.7 The theory was that by opening the 
church doors slightly wider, more people could 
come to hear God‘s word and would – inspired by 
Congregational rhetoric – experience the conversion 
moment, becoming full church members. The 
ministry would thus be enabled to continue to 
occupy its rightful place as spiritual leader and 
shaper of state affairs.  
The theological change generated by the 
Half-Way covenant was not in itself extreme, but, 
nevertheless, it spurred a contentious clerical 
debate. Clergymen first asked whether the alteration 
would cause a ―[dilution of] the purity of gathered 
churches by introducing unregenerate members.‖8 
Their second question was how wide the newly 
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cracked church doors should be opened. The first 
debate was resolved relatively quickly, concluding 
that the covenant would not dilute the purity of the 
churches, and most New England churches accepted 
the new covenant before the end of the seventeenth 
century.
9
 The second debate continued without a 
definitive answer into the first decades of the 
eighteenth century. 
In October 1684 a more widely applicable 
and no less influential change occurred in colonial 
New England. Edward Randolph, the colonial agent 
to the British Lords of Trade, recommended that the 
original Massachusetts Bay Charter be annulled. 
This recommendation was based upon the premise 
that New England settlers were acting contrary to 
England‘s political and legal system, primarily due 
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to instances of religious intolerance during which 
the British believed the colonists were being overly 
extreme in their persecutions. A new royal charter 
was formulated, incorporating the various New 
England colonies into the ―Dominion of New 
England‖ which was to be ruled by a crown-
appointed royal governor. Moreover, New England 
was to be subject to English common law, including 
religious toleration stipulated by England‘s 1689 
Act of Toleration.
10
 In its first two years, New 
Englanders essentially ignored the revocation of the 
charter, as it did not cause significant societal 
upheaval. In 1686, however, Sir Edmund Andros 
replaced Joseph Dudley, a Massachusetts native, as 
governor. Andros quickly began exercising his 
powers to their highest extent, demanding the use of 
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Old South Church in Boston for Anglican purposes, 
holding vice-admiralty courts to try colonialists‘ 
legal grievances, and seizing common lands in and 
around Boston for his private use.
11
 It was not long 
before the inherently independent New Englanders 
began to chafe at the bonds imposed by their 
arrogant new governor.  
In April 1688, ―unconfirmed reports‖ that 
James II had been deposed swept through Boston. 
On April 19, 1688, armed with this knowledge, 
townspeople assembled to arrest Governor Andros, 
Edmund Randolph, and Joseph Dudley. An interim 
government, the ―Committees for the Conservation 
of Peace,‖ was subsequently established to fill the 
gubernatorial void.
12
 While New England 
clergymen celebrated along with the rest of the 
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colonists, they also recognized that a working 
relationship with their mother country was 
necessary to the preservation of their civil and 
religious liberties.
13
 After the rebellion, Reverend 
Increase Mather traveled to England to explain the 
motives behind the colonists‘ actions in order to 
forestall any retribution and in hopes of regaining 
the original charter. The trip was a qualified 
success. In May of 1692, Increase Mather brought a 
new royal charter back to Boston that established 
Massachusetts, which was to encompass Maine and 
Plymouth, as a royal province. As in the first 
charter, the head of the government remained a 
royal governor, but he was to work in tandem with a 
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legislative assembly elected by the landowning men 
of the colony.
14
  
The revocation of the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony‘s original charter and the reactionary events 
it sparked were watershed moments in New 
England‘s history. Socially, the colonists had 
discovered that it was within their abilities to 
exercise their will and overthrow a governmental 
body with which they were unhappy. Religiously, 
once the revocation of the charter was finalized, it 
symbolized the loss of the original covenant 
between the New England colonies and God. This 
covenant was believed to have been bequeathed to 
the people by virtue of their adherence to Sola 
Scriptura above all other codes of law and the 
authority of the ―visible Saints‖ – fully converted 
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church members – within that state. But the new 
royal charter had not undermined ―Pure worship‖ 
and deference to God‘s Word, and so came forth the 
revelation that the national covenant was an 
unnecessary component to the success of the 
church-state.
15
 The belief in the absolute necessity 
of the national covenant had changed, and certain 
ministers would soon apply this reorientation to 
other elements in the covenant-driven Puritan faith. 
Moreover, the increased closeness between England 
and her New England colonies would more 
frequently expose the colonists to Anglican Church 
practices, for which they would begin to show a 
higher tolerance.
16
 Culturally, this same tightening 
of bonds between mother country and her New 
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England settlement saw the beginning of an era of 
heightened exchange of ideas and customs.  
 In November 1680 and December to January 
1681, astronomers around the world observed one 
of the brightest comets of the century streak across 
the celestial sphere. The astronomers recorded 
meticulous observations and engaged in 
conversations and debates regarding their findings. 
For the most part, this scientific activity occurred in 
Europe, such as among the London circles of Isaac 
Newton and John Flamsteed, the royal astronomer. 
But there was at least one circle in the ―wilderness‖ 
of the New England colonies that also observed the 
comet. Thomas Brattle and his colleague John 
Foster recorded their measurements and asserted the 
hypothesis that the two comet sightings had been of 
one comet that had passed around the sun and 
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changed direction. From among the global body of 
astronomers, only these two rural scientists and 
John Flamsteed made this correct assumption.
17
 For 
this astute conjecture, ―the observer in New 
England‖ would receive a nod in Isaac Newton‘s 
Mathematical Principles, ―the most scientific book 
of the age.‖18 Thomas Brattle, mathematician, 
scientist, merchant, Harvard professor, and one of 
the foremost figures in New England‘s Age of 
Enlightenment, would be among the most 
instrumental founders of the Brattle Street Church. 
With the establishment of the new royal 
charter, the European Enlightenment, ―the cultural 
force, transforming ideas about nature, design and 
beauty . . . . the age of Newton, Locke, Addison, 
                                                 
17
 Rick Kennedy, ―Thomas Brattle and the Scientific 
Provincialism of New England, 1680-1713,‖ The New 
England Quarterly 63, no. 4 (Dec., 1990): 587.  
18
 Ibid., 589.  
 86 
and Tillotson‖ came to New England. Thomas 
Brattle had a close relationship with Europe and 
developed his own mathematical and scientific 
skills prior to the advent of the new charter and 
New England‘s reception of the Enlightenment. 19 
As the age of reason and rationalism gained force in 
his native land, Thomas Brattle began to allow his 
logical tendencies to permeate throughout other 
aspects of his life. When in the small New England 
community of Salem during the spring of 1692 
witchcraft trial judges decreed that controversial 
―spectral‖ evidence – evidence based upon visions 
and dreams – was admissible for trial, thus sending 
dozens of people to prison and the gallows, Thomas 
Brattle penned a letter to a local divine in reaction 
to the events. The letter, written on October 8, 1692, 
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epitomized Brattle‘s religious rationalism. The letter 
quoted scripture and was steeped with religious 
arguments, but it was also infused with Brattle‘s 
―cool reason.‖ In admitting the disputed evidence 
and fueling the hysteria based upon the testimony of 
a few seemingly troubled young girls, Brattle 
asserted ―that the Justices have thus far given ear to 
the Devill, I think may be mathematically 
demonstrated to any man of common sense.‖20 
Moreover, he stated that the new legal precedents, 
this ―Salem Philosophy . . . rather deserves the 
name of Salem superstition and sorcery, and it is not 
fitt to be named in a land of such light as New-
England is.‖21  
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Thomas Brattle applied rationality to the 
Salem trials – a contemporary legal dispute that had 
a significant religious element. A few short years 
after he wrote the 1692 letter, Brattle repeated the 
doctrine of applying reason to religion. In 1698, he 
and other like-minded men seized upon various 
adaptations that had occurred in colonial society, 
such as the Half-Way covenant, the revocation of 
the charter, and the Enlightenment, to bring reason 
and religion together in a new church, undertaking 
the formation of the Brattle Street Church.
 22
 This 
decision was that of liberal-minded, rational men, 
attempting to be rational in the choice of their 
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church and its practices. At the same time, these 
men had no desire to be any less pious or 
theologically secure than their peers. The founders 
sent a letter of invitation on May 10, 1699 to their 
prospective pastor, Benjamin Colman, a Boston 
native who had been studying for four years in 
England. Colman‘s background complemented the 
founders‘ own sensibilities, making him fit for their 
needs. Their letter informed Colman that the 
founders had ―no design to depart from the doctrine 
and order of the Gospel, or from the practice of the 
churches of Christ in New England.‖23 They did 
request, however, that ―[publick] relations should be 
laid aside, and the Holy Scriptures publicly read in 
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the church.‖24 They also suggested that Colman be 
ordained ―before [he came] over by some Non-
conformist ministers in England‖25 so as to avoid 
any controversy his ordination might arouse in 
Boston.
26
 
Colman received the founders‘ invitation in 
Bath, England on July 19, 1699, along with letters 
of encouragement from the Reverends Ebenezer 
Pemberton and William Brattle, and other New 
England inhabitants. After sending a letter of 
agreement to the Boston ―undertakers,‖ Colman set 
out for London, arriving on August 1, 1699.
 27
 
Shortly thereafter, he was ordained by a number of 
men belonging to the London Presbytery. The 
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Reverend Colman then took his leave of England, 
entering Boston on November 1, 1699.
28
 On 
November 2, 1699, ―the Undertakers visited 
[Colman] in a full Meeting at [his] Brothers 
House.‖29 Less than three weeks subsequent to this 
meeting, on November 17, 1699, ―A Manifesto or 
Declaration, Set forth by the Undertakers of New 
Church, Now Erected in Boston in New England‖ 
was published in Boston.
30
 The document does not 
list a specific author, but it is likely that the release 
of the document was discussed and agreed upon at 
the November 2 meeting and that Benjamin 
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Colman, either solely or aided by the ―undertakers,‖ 
wrote the Manifesto. The purpose of releasing such 
a document was ―for preventing all 
Misapprehensions and Jealousies‖ in hopes that 
publishing the church‘s ―Aims and Desires‖ would 
put an end to the debates surrounding the subject of 
its foundation.
31
  
The sixteen-point declaration set forth, step 
by step, the characteristics and practices of the new 
church. First, the church stipulated that it adhered to 
both the ―Confession of Faith put forth by the 
Assembly of Divines at Westminster‖ and the 
―known practice of many of the Churches of the 
UNITED BRETHREN in London, and throughout 
all England.‖32 As such, they believed it was 
―suitable and convenient‖ to read the Holy Scripture 
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in public worship. The undertakers also asserted 
that they would ―dare not refuse [Baptism] to any 
Child offered to [them] by any professed Christian, 
upon his engagement to see it Educated, if God give 
life and ability, in the Christian religion‖ and would 
allow the pastor to exercise ultimate authority over 
these matters.
33
 The undertakers noted that the 
pastor‘s power to baptize or admit members would 
extend to the exclusion of those members, and 
therefore gave the pastor the implicit ―consent and 
concurrence of the Brethren‖ in matters of 
―Suspending or Excommunicating an Offender.‖34 
Regarding the Sacrament of the Lord‘s 
Supper, the undertakers noted that ―as the 
Ordinance is Holy, so the Partakers in it . . . . must 
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be persons of visible Sanctity.‖35 Thus all who 
desired to partake in the Supper were to be subject 
to the pastor‘s inquiries regarding their ―knowledge 
and Spiritual State.‖36 Yet unlike the rest of the 
Boston congregations, they would ―assume not to 
[themselves] to impose upon any a Publick 
Relations of their Experiences.‖37 The Brethren, or 
the full church members, might inquire into 
potential communicants‘ ―life and conversation,‖ 
but such inquiries were to occur in private. The 
authors then defined the concept of ―a particular 
Church, as such, is a society of Christians by mutual 
agreement, usually meeting together for Publick 
Worship in the same place, and under the same 
Ministry‖ in which society ―the Law of nature 
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dictates to [them], that there is implied a mutual 
promise and engagement of being faithful to the 
relations they bear to each other, whither as private 
Christians, or as pastor and flock, so long as the 
Providence of God continues them in those 
relations.‖38 The Manifesto declared that its church 
―could not confine the right of chusing a Minister to 
the Male Communicants alone,‖ stating that the 
church would instead allow ―every Baptized Adult 
Person who contributes to the Maintenance [of the 
church and pastor], [to] have a Vote in Electing.‖39 
The Manifesto concluded by noting ―in some of 
these particulars only, and in no other, do we see 
cause to depart from what is ordinarily Professed 
and Practised by the Churches of CHRIST here in 
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New-England.‖40 Moreover, the founders asserted 
that despite their departure, they still hoped ―to hold 
Communion with the Churches here, as true 
Churches.‖ The authors expected members of 
Brattle Street to be received at other churches‘ 
communion tables and invited others to their own 
table.
41
 Implications contrary to these statements 
were ―most injurious‖ to the founders, since they 
believed that the ways in which their practices 
departed from the other churches‘ did not 
undermine ―Evangelical Purity and Holiness in 
[their] Communion.‖42 
The Brattle Street Church departed from 
traditional New England practices by extending 
baptism to any child of a proclaimed Christian; 
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dispensing with public relations of experiences by 
potential communicants; reading Scripture without 
interpretation in church services (a traditionally 
Anglican practice); and bestowing the right of 
participation to all contributing baptized persons in 
church affairs, especially the in election of a pastor. 
These innovations were not drastically different 
from the system that was in place in the 
Congregational community at large. Most New 
England churches had already extended the 
privilege of baptism to a larger group of children as 
a result of the 1662 Half-Way covenant. The Brattle 
Street Church was only pushing those cracked doors 
all the way open. While the other transformations 
did not follow as palpable a precedent as the 
Synod‘s 1662 decision, neither were they without 
prior models. In 1677, Solomon Stoddard, the 
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pastor at Northampton, dispelled with barriers to 
baptism or the communion table, ―identifying the 
church not with a society of saints but with the town 
meeting.‖43 In 1687, in The Safety of Appearing at 
the Day of Judgment, he argued that the ―covenant‖ 
was not to be interpreted as a contractual 
relationship between man and God, but as God‘s 
command without any ability for men to 
consciously commit to this relationship.
44
 
Stoddard‘s changes had far-reaching implications, 
but in the most immediate sense he undermined 
both the covenant language and challenged 
exclusion to communion. William Brattle, Thomas 
Brattle‘s brother, was another controversial 
minister. He preached from his Cambridge pulpit in 
1697 ―the formal and public relations of candidates 
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might be dispensed with, that an examination by the 
pastor and elders should suffice, and that the people 
would signify their assent by silence.‖45 The Brattle 
Street Church Manifesto prescribed exactly to 
William Brattle‘s message – as Thomas Brattle‘s 
brother, he was another influential member in its 
foundation. While there was no contention in the 
Brattle Street declaration that opened the 
Communion table to all men, nor that directly 
undermined the covenant, as Stoddard had done, 
there were like elements in the Northampton 
pastor‘s and the Brattle Street Manifesto‘s differing 
amendments.
46
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 The Brattle Street Church did not choose to 
directly associate with Solomon Stoddard, nor would they 
have listed him among those who had influenced their 
Manifesto. Stoddard was surrounded by a wealth of 
controversy; he was locked in a particularly contentious 
debate with Increase Mather. It was not, therefore, ―politic‖ of 
Brattle Street to align themselves with the Northampton 
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What was inherently different between 
William Brattle and Solomon Stoddard‘s models 
and the foundation of the Brattle Street Church was 
that neither William Brattle nor Solomon Stoddard 
had established a new church based upon their 
arguments. Theological debates in themselves had a 
long-standing tradition in the New England colonies 
– they fomented change and evolution and were a 
key component in keeping the clergy alert and ready 
to defend the faith. But renting the fabric of a New 
England community by establishing a new and 
separate church based upon debated disagreements 
was a new and radical concept. Thus it was a 
quixotic supposition that the Brattle Street 
Manifesto would dispel any arguments against the 
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church; if anything, the Manifesto fueled the 
debates, which only became more caustic in the 
following months.  
On December 30, 1699, Salem Ministers 
John Higginson and Nicholas Noyes, both revered 
members of the New England Congregational 
community, sent a letter ―To the Gentlemen, the 
authors and owners of the Declaration,‖ the 
undertakers of the Brattle Street Church.
47
 The letter 
ungraciously ripped the Manifesto to shreds. 
Beginning with a niggling jab at the word 
―Manifesto‖ itself – the Salem men called it overly 
imperious – the letter questioned each of the 
Manifesto‘s innovations in a patronizing and 
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mordant tone. Asserting that the Brattle Street 
undertakers had not shown due deference to their 
fellow church community leaders, the letter cried 
―Sirs! How could you forsake the dear churches 
some of you belonged to, whose breasts you had 
sucked, and on whose knees you had been dandled, 
without dropping one tear in your declaration?‖48 A 
further claim was that the Brattle Street Manifesto‘s 
omission of any explicit statement as to the 
necessity of covenanting with God in a ―public and 
personal giving up yourselves in Christ, according 
to the Covenant of his grace‖ implied Brattle 
Street‘s belief in its needlessness, to which 
Higginson and Noyes took great offence.
49
 As to 
those baptized by the church, Higginson and Noyes 
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sneeringly remarked that soon enough any and all 
children would be ―promiscuously baptized.‖50  
The Salem pastors further pointed out that 
the Manifesto endowed the Brattle Street Church 
pastor with entirely too much power as was ―meet 
to be put in any one man living.‖51 The Manifesto 
had given the Brethren‘s implicit consent in all 
matters of both admission and exclusion of church 
members and had not mentioned the explicit need 
for a ―consistory of elders.‖52 This concern was 
compounded by the neglect of the Brattle Street 
Church to seek the ―right of the fellowship of 
neighboring churches,‖ thus implying Brattle 
Street‘s belief in the dispensability of advice from 
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neighboring pastors or elders.
 53
 Given this, 
Higginson and Noyes contended that Brattle 
Streeters had only mentioned their wish to be part 
of the communion of churches in a desultory and 
careless manner. When this misstep was added to 
Brattle Street‘s definition of a church – which had 
not included any mention of relative duties to God – 
Higginson and Noyes counseled the Brattle Street 
founders to refer to ―a little book (called ‗Spiritual 
Milk for Boston Babes, drawn out of the Breasts of 
both Testaments‘)‖ and to begin with the question 
―‗What is the church?‘‖54 The Salem pastors also 
found that the last article of the Manifesto, which 
had bestowed upon all contributing baptized adults 
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the right to participate in choosing their pastor, to be 
frankly irresponsible. The Manifesto‘s language 
implied that females would vote as well as males, 
and since ―the females are certainly more than the 
males . . . . the choice of ministers is put into their 
hands.‖55 Even worse, in allowing the baptized 
adult non-communicants‘ opinions to weigh with 
equal measure to the communicants – whom the 
non-communicants outnumbered – the non-
communicants would be in a position to wreak 
havoc on the entire church system.
56
  
Higginson and Noyes‘ last grievance was 
unrelated to the content of the Manifesto. Rather, 
they asked the Brattle Street community why they 
had not informed the New England Congregational 
community that there were certain common 
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practices the founders found in need of reform 
before choosing to set out alone. The pastors 
chastised the Brattle Street founders; ―If you could 
have convinced [the other churches] that [the 
current practices] were evil, they would certainly 
have [forsaken them], for they do not pretend 
perfection in knowledge.‖57 This, then, was the 
underlying problem that drove all the rest. The 
theological liberalism of the Brattle Street Church 
was ―offensive‖ to pastors such as John Higginson 
and Nicholas Noyes, but what they truly could not 
sanction was that Brattle Street had acted 
unilaterally to enact those offensive practices. The 
foundation of the Brattle Street Church had upset 
the peace, and this the pastors could not forgive. At 
the conclusion of their letter, Higginson and Noyes 
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beseeched the Brattle Street undertakers to either 
annul the Manifesto or to ―explain it to satisfaction, 
by adjusting matters between yourselves and 
neighboring elders and churches.‖58 The most 
fundamental issue, and the one which demanded the 
highest degree of gravity, was not the Brattle Street 
Manifesto itself, but a restoration of peace and unity 
to the New England Congregational body.  
A few weeks before this letter had been sent, 
at their December 12 meeting, the Brattle Street 
Brethren voted that ―Mr. Colman present the 
Desires of the Society to the Ministers of the Town 
to keep a day of Prayer with [them].‖ 59 This day of 
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prayer would act as the Boston ministry‘s official 
recognition of Reverend Colman and the Brattle 
Street church, finalizing Colman‘s installation as 
minister. Reverend Colman sent letters of invitation 
to the Boston Congregational Ministers shortly after 
this meeting. ―Mr. Colman‖ – quite a disrespectful 
way to address an ordained minister – received a 
reply from Reverends Increase Mather and James 
Allen on December 28, 1699. The terse note was 
even less polite than had been the Higginson and 
Noyes letter. The Salem pastors, at least, both 
explained their reasoning and gave an alternate 
option to revoking the Manifesto, albeit in a 
supercilious tone. Mather and Allen, on the other 
hand, stated that unless the Brattle Street Church 
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were to ―lay aside‖ their Manifesto, the Boston 
pastors could not join in communion or shared 
prayer with the society. To do so would be 
―interpreted as an approbation of those 
miscarriages, which both before and since the 
publication of the said Manifesto, it [seemed] to 
them, [the Brattle Street community] had fallen 
into.‖60 For all this bluster, the Boston ministers 
came to an agreement within a month that ―the 
forms of the Christian fellowship‖ would be 
observed; it is likely that Reverends Samuel Sewall 
and William Stoughton convinced the rest of the 
local ministry to come to a consensus.
61
 Colman‘s 
entry in the Brattle Street Church records for 
January 31, 1700, reads ―Wednesday the 31. of 
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January, was separated by us for public Imploring 
the Presence of GOD with us, His pardon and 
Blessing; & accordingly Solemnized.‖62 Peace was 
seemingly restored. But the peace was shaky at best, 
born out of necessity rather than agreement or 
understanding.  
In the spring of 1700, a long-standing debate 
between Solomon Stoddard, the controversial 
Northampton minister, and Increase Mather came to 
a head. Rumor had it that Stoddard planned to send 
a pamphlet to England in order to publish his 
doctrine of worship. Mather wanted to publish a 
sermon to undermine any Stoddard publication, but, 
given certain parallels between Stoddard‘s doctrine 
and that of the Brattle Street Church, it was likely 
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that any sermon against Stoddard would be 
interpreted as an insult to Colman and the Brattle 
Street undertakers. In light of the recent peace, this 
was an unfortunate externality, but Mather could 
not allow Stoddard to proceed uncontested. In 
March 1700, he published The Order of the 
Gospel.
63
 Mather‘s scripture verses for the sermon 
were from Jeremiah – ―I had planted thee a noble 
vine, wholly a right seed – why gaddest thou about 
so much to change thy way?‖ and Colossians – 
―Joying and beholding your Order, - and the 
Steadfastness of your Faith.‖64 In his introduction, 
Mather cried, ―Is there no one that will stand up for 
the Churches of Christ? The Good People in them 
may then well think that their Watchmen are all 
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either Dead or Asleep.‖65 Language such as this 
combined with Mather‘s arguments directly against 
such practices as had been enacted in Brattle Street 
made a rebuttal by Benjamin Colman inevitable.
 66
   
In November 1700, ―sundry Ministers‖ in 
New England released in Boson Gospel Order 
Revived, Being an Answer to a Book lately set forth 
by the Reverend Mr. Increase Mather.‖67 This 
sermon, though officially of anonymous authorship, 
was undeniably Benjamin Colman‘s answer to 
Increase Mather.
68
 Claiming to stand for ―Truth, 
according to God‘s Word,‖ Colman proceeded to 
pick apart each of Mather‘s arguments. 69 To 
repudiate Mather‘s justifications for the necessity of 
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potential church members‘ public relation of their 
moments of conversion, Colman argued that the 
practice was an institution of man rather than God – 
it had no scriptural foundation. Moreover, Colman 
asked, ―And with what face can we impose it, when 
our Fathers fled from the impositions of men?‖70 
Man did not have the authority to ―debate the 
refusal from any Christian [the] privilege [of 
membership]‖ and it was therefore peremptory of 
any church body to require a public relation in order 
to exclude certain persons from worship.
 71
 Colman 
moved on to discuss the benefits of public reading 
of scripture ―without explication or exhortation 
there-with‖ in public worship, which Increase 
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Mather had called ―Dumb Reading.‖72 While 
Colman granted that congregants came to church to 
hear ―the Word read with prejudice‖ as 
communicated by God to the minister, and 
thereafter transmitted by the minister in his 
sermons, scripture was direct inspiration from God. 
Thus the ―reading [of] God‘s Word in the great 
Congregation, is . . . . the greatest Reverence and 
Honour we can [show Him.]‖73  
The next issue Colman addressed was 
whether ―Baptism [was] to be administered to all 
Children, whom any professing Christians shall 
engage to so see educated in the Christian 
Religion.‖74 Colman first dispelled with any 
misconceptions that this definition meant to include 
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either ―Papists‖ or any other of the ―grossest 
Hereticks;‖75 professed Christians, rather, referred 
to all those who ―profess their Faith in Christ, and 
obedience to him.‖ If, then, papists and other 
regenerates were not included in this group, Colman 
professed disbelief that any ―conscientious 
Minister‖ would not support the education of a child 
in the Christian religion followed by an embrace of 
that child into the flock.
76
 Colman then 
communicated his defense for the participation of 
both communicants and non-communicants in 
choosing their pastor. Colman stated that ―the 
administration of the Lord‘s Supper is but one 
[aspect] of a Ministers work, and but a little part, 
compared with all the rest . . . . [so] For some few to 
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appoint who shall be the Preacher to whole 
Congregation is as highly irrational.‖77  
Colman was likely most concerned about 
these four arguments. His new congregation had 
explicitly and ardently affirmed these four practices 
as the platform on which they stood and the reasons 
for which they had founded the Brattle Street 
Church. These arguments, however, were not the 
only ones that Colman made in Gospel Order 
Revived. Colman responded to each of the 
contentions that Increase Mather had presented in 
Order of the Gospel, many of which were not of 
great concern to the Brattle Street Church. Mather‘s 
plan had backfired. In releasing Order of the Gospel 
as an argument against Solomon Stoddard‘s 
disputed doctrines, he had broken a newly formed 
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bond between himself and the Brattle Street 
minister. In doing so, Mather unwittingly fomented 
the circumstances by which another argument in 
support of Solomon Stoddard reached Boston 
audiences. Cotton Mather wrote bitterly that all the 
recent publications, including Colman‘s, ―‗do sett 
the People in a mighty Ferment. All the Adversaries 
of the Churches lay their Heads together, as if by 
Blasting of us, they hoped utterly to blow up all.‘‖78 
Despite the 1700 debates, as the decade 
gained steam, the dispute lost its heat. The Brattle 
Street Church continued to be perceived as a liberal 
Congregation, but the controversy surrounding the 
supposed ―radicalism‖ of its practices faded into the 
background as time marched on. Benjamin Colman, 
while perhaps never as well respected as his 
                                                 
78
 Cotton Mather in Miller, The New England Mind, 
246.  
 118 
ministerial contemporaries, had been officially 
sanctioned. He and his flock were safe and stable. 
Over the course of the decade, Colman participated 
as an active member of the Boston Congregational 
community. He preached multiple occasion-day 
sermons, including one on the occasion of the 
election of officers to the ―Honourable Artillery‖ in 
1702 and various sermons presented to the General 
Court and the Governor at Boston Lectures.
79
 And 
in 1711, when the Old South Church meeting-house 
was destroyed in the Great Fire of Boston, it was 
with Brattle Street Church that they gathered for 
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worship until May 1713.
80
 Peace, shaky at the 
outset, had solidified, and unity had been restored. 
But the fragmentation of the Congregational body 
that the foundation of the Brattle Street Church 
represented was not an isolated incident. Within just 
a few decades, the Great Awakening, a period of 
religious revival that occurred throughout the 
American colonies from the 1730s to the 1760s, 
would flood New England with passions, 
enthusiasm, resentment, debates, and Old Light 
versus New Light splits that would cause the Brattle 
Street Church controversy to pale in comparison. It 
cannot be said that the foundation of the Brattle 
Street Church had any direct bearing in causing the 
events of the Great Awakening to unfold. 
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Simultaneously, the foundation of the Brattle Street 
Church was the first instance when a 
Congregational Church would take it upon itself to 
break away from the established community of 
churches and found a new house of worship based 
upon contested ideas and practices. Moreover, both 
in the societal transformations that inspired it and 
the foundation itself, the church stood as one of the 
first examples of New England‘s original ―City 
upon a Hill‖ conception cracking. The church was 
born in an era of theological debate and dissent that 
the founders radicalized. The Brattle Street Church 
founders reacted to their transforming society in 
such a way as had not ever occurred before, but that 
would be repeated many times thereafter. 
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Gallipoli: The Spark That Would Ignite an 
Empire 
Brendan Quigley 
The expansion and growth of the Ottoman 
Empire in the early 1300s is one that has both 
intrigued and puzzled Western scholars for many 
years. Small bands of Islamic frontier raiders were 
able to join together and ultimately become a 
powerful empire that spanned three continents and 
had subjects of many different religions, cultural 
backgrounds and ethnicities. How did this happen? 
What was the spark that ignited the wildfire that 
would become the mighty and feared Ottoman 
Empire? Looking back on Ottoman history, one 
major acquisition, that is, the successful capture of a 
peninsula known as Gallipoli or Gelibolu in the 
Aegean Sea would give the Ottomans a permanent 
foothold in Europe from which to launch their 
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forces into the Balkans and was responsible for the 
amazing Ottoman expansion after 1300. The 
strategic location of Gallipoli between Anatolia and 
the Middle East and Europe has made Gallipoli one 
of the most strategic locations within the Ottoman 
Empire, serving as a gateway between continents. 
History has proven that whichever nation has been 
able to hold Gallipoli has been able to keep power 
in the region. 
In order to understand the significance of the 
Gallipoli peninsula it is necessary to first look to the 
beginnings of the Ottoman Empire. This empire 
was able to emerge around the turn of the 14
th
 
century in Anatolia by joining many independent 
clans or ―states‖ that shared a common goal; to 
expand the influence of Islam in the region. The 
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once defining historical thesis on this significant 
spark that would be the origins of the Ottoman 
Empire was written by Paul Wittek in 1937. This 
―Ghazi Thesis‖ proposed that it was the religious 
zeal of Islam that drove many of these Turkish 
raiders to spread across the Middle East and into 
Europe, taking control of land and people in an 
attempt to convert them to Islam.
1
 While this thesis 
has been hotly debated for decades, one thing is 
certain, and that is that these groups of raiders, for 
whatever reason, did manage to expand from the 
frontiers of Anatolia into the Middle East and Asia 
as well as the Balkans of Europe, and Gallipoli 
would become the main reason for the latter. 
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The early years for this band of frontier 
principalities were full of violence and bloodshed. 
This small confederation of Islamist states struggled 
to survive amongst several more powerful 
neighbors including the Persians and Byzantines. 
However, it was in these early years of the Ottoman 
Empire (in the 1350s) that a wise Orhan Bey, the 
son of Osman (creator of the Ottoman Empire), 
noticed internal struggle within their close neighbor, 
the Byzantine Empire, and decided to would take 
advantage of the situation. In 1346 Orhan made an 
alliance with John VI Cantacuzemus, a ―claimant‖ 
or ―pretender‖ to the Byzantine throne.
2
 To solidify 
the alliance, Orhan married Cantacuzemus‘s 
daughter, Theodora. This alliance put 6,000 
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Ottoman troops in Byzantine territory to support the 
rebel cause and gave Orhan an excuse to meddle in 
Byzantine affairs.
3
 When Cantacuzemus called for 
Ottoman support against the Serbs and Bulgarians 
in 1352, Orhan quickly dispatched his troops to 
Thrace, an outpost on the eastern side of Gallipoli, 
leaving his son, Suleyman Pasha, in charge of all 
Ottoman forces in the area. Suleyman‘s forces were 
able to take Thrace, but instead of putting the land 
back in Cantacuzemus‘s hands, Suleyman decided 
to bring in more troops from Anatolia and lay siege 
to the fortresses on the Gallipoli peninsula.
4
 
Although Cantacuzemus strongly insisted that 
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Suleyman immediately retreat from Thrace and 
Gallipoli, his protests fell on deaf Ottoman ears.
5
 
 Although Suleyman had captured Thrace 
and was able to replenish his forces with more 
troops from Anatolia, his siege of the Gallipoli 
fortresses was moving at a very slow rate. In a last 
ditch attempt to regain lost Byzantine land in 
Thrace, John VI Cantacuzemus offered to pay 
Orhan to leave. Just as the Ottomans were about to 
accept this deal the area was rocked with a violent 
earthquake. It broke down the walls of several 
fortresses on the Gallipoli peninsula and caused 
major damage to the surrounding villages. While 
the Christian defenders rushed out from their 
devastated stronghold, Ottoman forces took control 
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and quickly rebuilt what was destroyed.
6
 Again 
Suleyman brought in more troops and supplies to 
fortify his new outpost. This move sent shockwaves 
throughout Europe, as calls for a Crusade began to 
be heard throughout the continent.
7
 
 Many historians look back on the taking of 
Gallipoli as a major turning point in Ottoman 
history. Halil Inalcik writes in his book, The 
Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, 
that prior to the acquisition of Gallipoli the Ottoman 
State was ―no more than one of many frontier 
principalities,‖ and that ―the events after 1352 so 
firmly established its superiority over others that 
within 30 years they had become a tight knit and 
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powerful empire.‖
8
 Inalcik would also claim that 
the conquest of Gallipoli was a ―crucial event‖ for 
the Ottomans, as the Ottomans were able to ―gain a 
foothold in the Balkans with the prospects of 
limitless expansion towards the west.‖
9
 The later 
capture of Constantinople, as well as Ottoman 
excursions into Serbia, Wallachia, Hungary, 
Byzantium, and other Balkan lands would be the 
direct result of the seizure of Gallipoli. Carter 
Findley writes that the Ottomans were able to 
expand because of their conquest and winning of 
conquered societies as a direct result of their prime 
location and stronghold in Gallipoli.
10
 This 
peninsula provided a spring board for later Ottoman 
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advances into Europe and, as long as the Ottomans 
were able to keep control of it, they had a vital 
lifeline from their homeland into Europe. 
 Also related to the success at Gallipoli was 
Sultan Murad I‘s decision to move the Ottoman 
capital from Bursa to Edirne. At the time Edirne 
was located on the outskirts of Ottoman territory 
and very close to ―hostile neighbors‖. Steve 
Turnbull claims that this bold move clearly showed 
that Murad believed he could and was about to 
expand his empire, ―making his advance from a 
firm base in the Gellibolu area.‖
11
 Mark Mazower 
also notes that less than 20 years after Orhan was 
able to win a foothold on Gallipoli the Byzantine 
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Emperor, Jean V Paleologue made his submission 
to his successor Murad I.
12
 
 As the Christian powers became 
increasingly worried about a growing Ottoman 
Empire, plans were made to snatch Gallipoli back 
from Ottoman hands. Although talks of a crusade 
began to fester in Europe, they did not come to 
fruition at this time and the only ruler to respond to 
the request was the Byzantine Emperor‘s cousin, 
Duke Amadeus VI of Savoy.
13
 In 1366 Amadeus 
was able to capture Gallipoli and immediately 
returned it to the Byzantines.
14
 This loss was a 
major setback for the Ottomans, as they were 
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effectively cut off from their conquered European 
lands. Ottoman expansion westward came to a 
grinding halt without the troops and supplies that 
the Gallipoli lifeline provided.
15
 While this time 
was certainly a frantic and worried for Ottoman 
leaders, Gallipoli would fall back into Ottoman 
hands in 1376, thanks to an arrangement by Murad I 
where he secured the Byzantine throne for 
Adronicus IV in exchange for the vital peninsula.
16
 
 From this trade it becomes apparent that 
Gallipoli was important to the Ottomans and that 
they knew it. As stated before it was certainly a 
lifeline into the Balkans and would later be used as 
a buffer to stop advancing armies and navies into 
Ottoman lands. It is also important to note the 
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importance of Gallipoli in a social sense. After 
Suleyman took control of Gallipoli, and to a greater 
extent when Murad I retained Gallipoli in 1376, 
both Ottoman rulers began to strengthen this 
―European stronghold‖ with Muslims from 
Anatolia. The majority of Turkish civilians that 
moved to this land were nomads, as it was believed 
that they could easily transition and adapt to a new 
Ottoman acquisition.
17
 Turkish villages began to 
spring up and establish a frontier that kept 
expanding as more and more Turks settled in this 
land. Although the Turks would have skirmishes 
and battles in and around Gallipoli over the course 
of the next 538 years, the area would never fall out 
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of Ottoman hands, allowing a unique Turkish 
culture to flourish.
18
 
 Drawing a timeline backwards from the 
many accomplishments of the Ottoman Empire, one 
can see that Gallipoli is often where these 
accomplishments originated. While this may be a 
bold statement, many of the Ottoman advances, 
including naval advances, came from the 
springboard that was Gallipoli. Events that would 
not seem associated with Gallipoli, upon further 
inspection, turn out to be directly related to this vital 
conquest. For example, Ottoman offenses against 
the Byzantines in 1357 (which began in Gallipoli) 
led to the capture of Adrianople. From the prisoners 
of a captured Adrianople, Sultan Murad I created 
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the first Janissary Corps.
19
 In later years the 
Janissaries would be used as the tip of the Ottoman 
―spear,‖ becoming the first standing army and 
replacing ―ghazi‖ tribal warriors. In later years the 
Jannisaries would be key to winning many battles, 
especially against John Hunyadi and the 
Hungarians. If Murad was never able to capture 
Adrianople using forces from Gallipoli, the idea of 
the Janissaries might never have come to be 
realized, and history would have been changed 
forever. 
 Another pinnacle in Ottoman history was the 
sacking of Constantinople, the capital of an aging 
Byzantine Empire. While many nations, tribal 
groups, and empires before the Ottomans had tried 
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to capture the ancient city, all had failed. In 1453 a 
young Sultan, Mehmet II, decided that he would try 
his hand at doing what others before him had failed 
to accomplish: conquering Constantinople. While 
the defenses of Constantinople were impressive--
they had managed to keep the capital in Byzantine 
hands well after the fall of the Roman Empire--
Mehmet II decided to attack the capital from both 
land and sea, using a naval force that was assembled 
at Gallipoli. Although initially unsuccessful in their 
attack on a much smaller Venetian force, the 
Ottoman navy was able to strike a blow to the 
Byzantines after several vessels were carried over a 
small patch of land into waters close to the city 
walls.
20
 As was the case in many Ottoman offenses 
                                                 
20
 Professor Karen Pinto. Class Notes from History 
 136 
of this period and future periods, Gallipoli was vital 
in acquiring new lands and defeating Ottoman 
enemies.  
 It is also important to understand the role 
that the Ottoman navy played in Ottoman history. 
After conquering the Byzantine Empire and 
expanding Ottoman territory upwards to the 
Mediterranean the Ottomans had traded one enemy 
for a new one. This enemy was the Venetians of 
present-day Italy. While the Ottomans were feared 
for the skill of their armies, their navy at this point 
was still relatively weak. The Venetians, boasting a 
proud and very successful navy, had often fought 
skirmishes with the Ottoman navy and, in an 
attempt to destroy the Ottoman fleet, they attacked 
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the naval base at Gallipoli in 1416.
21
 Although the 
Venetians were able to decimate the Ottoman navy 
at Gallipoli, they could not overtake the Ottoman 
fortresses or destroy the inner harbor naval base and 
were forced to sign a treaty with Mehmet I to ―keep 
the status quo.‖22 As would be the case with the 
Ottoman navy for years to come, they were forced 
to rebuild, but maintained power in the region. 
Because the Turks were able to keep Gallipoli, they 
could still keep their power in the region. 
 Although firmly in Ottoman possession, 
Gallipoli seemed to be at the forefront of Byzantine 
and Ottoman minds. As the halfway point (at least 
until Ottoman control of Constantinople in 1453) 
between Byzantine Europe and the Ottoman Middle 
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East, whoever held this valuable land had a great 
chance of keeping the other power in check. A 
major scare for Ottoman forces immediately 
followed Sultan Mehmet I‘s death in 1421, as 
Mehmet‘s rebellious brother Mustafa agreed to cede 
Gallipoli back to the Byzantines. Again the 
Ottomans were in danger of losing their most 
valuable staging ground and naval base. Mehmet‘s 
young son, Murad, realized this and decided to fight 
against his uncle using a loyal Janissary Corps. 
Murad was able to defeat Mustafa, keep Gallipoli in 
Ottoman hands, and regain lost Byzantine lands that 
his father had fought so hard to obtain.
23
 
 As the Ottoman Empire began to expand 
past Gallipoli in the late 1400s it became less of 
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buffer against the West but was still very important 
to the empire in many other ways. During the late 
1400s the Ottomans began a profitable trade 
relationship with Florence, and used the port at 
Gallipoli as a major trading center. This helped the 
Ottoman economy to grow and prosper during this 
time.
24
 Gallipoli also became a major mill for 
producing gunpowder for Ottoman guns during the 
16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, as its proximity to the 
Aegean, Mediterranean and Black Sea allowed for 
quick distribution to other Ottoman held territories. 
It must also be noted that Gallipoli was the main 
center for producing the cloth for the sails on ships 
during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century and the largest 
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naval dockyard in the Ottoman Empire for well over 
a century.
25
 
 In understanding the importance of Gallipoli 
as a naval base one must understand the 
significance that the Ottomans put on their navy 
starting with Mehmet II. Mehmet the Conqueror 
understood that a powerful army would only 
advance the Ottomans so far without the aid of a 
strong navy. He learned this lesson battling smaller 
numbers of Venetian ships and losing in the Siege 
of Constantinople. In fact, many Sultans after 
Mehmet attempted to strengthen their navy so that 
they would be on par with or more powerful than 
the navies of their adversaries. With this in mind the 
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Ottoman leaders carefully chose the Governor of 
Gallipoli, as he would become the commander of 
the entire Ottoman Mediterranean fleet.
26
 This post 
became one of the most important in the entire 
Ottoman Empire.
27
 
 While the history of Gallipoli before the 20
th
 
century shows how important this little peninsula 
was to the creation and endurance of the Ottoman 
Empire for over 500 years, this significance is often 
overshadowed by the events that unfolded there in 
the Great War, World War I. The Ottoman Empire 
joined the war on the side of the Central Powers: 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria. Because 
warfare had stalled and trench warfare resulted in a 
stalemate, British and French forces decided in 
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1914 and 1915 that they would attempt to end the 
war quickly by defeating Turkey and adding a new 
supply route to their ally, Russia.
28
 The logical 
location for attack fell upon the peninsula of 
Gallipoli. 
 Despite the vital importance of Gallipoli, its 
defenses fell into disrepair after years of inaction. 
Only after Mahmut II‘s shock at a major Ottoman 
loss at Konya did he attempt to strengthen his 
defenses, including Gallipoli in 1837.
29
 Viewing 
the aging and obsolete fortresses falling apart after 
the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 again focus was 
placed on improving Gallipoli but progress was 
slow. By the time World War I broke out in 1914, 
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the Ottomans were ―not ready‖ for war. In early 
August of 1914 Gallipoli was ill equipped and 
seriously lacking man power and weapons. Three 
infantry divisions on the peninsula only made up 
14,000 troops and 2,300 animals. After a quick rush 
to resupply, troop numbers were up to 30,000 men 
and 7,000 animals within months.
30
 Even with these 
preparations the land around the Dardanelles was 
still weak from aging and obsolete fortifications. To 
assist their allies, the Germans sent Admiral von 
Usedom, an expert in sea costal defenses, as well as 
500 German costal artillery and mine experts to 
defend against a possible Allied attack.
31
 The 
Germans were also able to send limited supplies to 
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the Ottomans through neutral Bulgaria and 
Romania. 
 Hostilities against the Ottomans started in 
November of 1914 with the British ―briefly‖ 
bombarding Turkish forts along the Dardanelles. 
While damage was small, the British did succeed in 
accelerating Turkish fortifications.
32
 By early 1915 
Gallipoli had added a further 6,000 soldiers, 263 
more cannons as well as eight machine guns. In 
1915 the 19
th
 Infantry Division fell under the 
command of a ―young‖ and ―aggressive‖ Colonel 
Mustafa Kemal Bey, later to become the founder of 
an independent Turkey.
33
 This escalation of troops 
and supplies shows that the Turks feared losing 
Gallipoli, just as the Byzantines had 500 years 
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before. Thanks to German 150 millimeter howitzer 
cannons, the Turks at Gallipoli wreaked havoc on 
British ships passing through the narrow straits.
34
 
 Although taking significant damage from 
Turkish defenses, the British Navy was able to deal 
several major blows to the Ottomans, including a 
battle in the winter of 1915 in which fortresses on 
Kum Kale and Seddelbahir were completely 
destroyed.
35
 This victory gave the British a false 
sense of hope, as their hopes that the Ottoman 
defenders were weak and incompetent were correct. 
As the British prepared for a major naval assault 
against the Turkish defenses at Gallipoli and the 
surrounding coastal lands, the Ottomans went to 
work relaying mines and submarine nets and 
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rebuilding destroyed defenses. Their strategy for 
defeating the British and keeping a firm hold of 
Gallipoli hindered on 3 main points: 
1- Mobile howitzer cannons were to be used to 
strike at an incoming fleet and stop any 
minesweeping ships from taking the lead of 
the incoming fleet. 
2- Underwater mines and anti-submarine nets 
would destroy ships too big to be destroyed 
with howitzer cannons. 
3-  Improved costal defenses would deal with 
any ships that made it through the first two 
points.
36
 
 
The British and French naval assault finally came in 
the spring of 1915, as the allied navies attempted to 
punch through the Dardanelles into the Sea of 
Marmara. At first the allied navy had success in 
silencing a few forts, but heavy howitzer fire caused 
damage and confusion amongst the European ships. 
The assault was called off after three ships had 
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quickly sunk as a result of hitting underwater mines 
and three larger battleships were greatly damaged 
from other mines. It was at this point that the 
British realized they could not control the 
Dardanelles with a naval force alone, and prepared 
the armies of France, England, Australia, and New 
Zealand for a ground offensive to destroy Ottoman 
fortifications and troops in an attempt to capture 
Gallipoli.
37
 Thanks to minor British attacks and 
invasion scares, Turkish troop readiness had 
reached a high level prior to the Gallipoli 
Campaign.
38
 
 In describing the Gallipoli Campaign 
historian Edward J. Erickson claims that it was a 
coming of age for not only the Turks, but for 
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Australians and New Zealanders as well: ―The 
victory at Gallipoli was of huge physical and 
psychological importance and is vividly 
remembered in Turkey today.‖
39
 It is often 
remembered as a major and terrible disaster for the 
allies, with an estimated 280,000 allied casualties 
(44,000 deaths).
40
 Adding insult to injury, British 
and French naval forces entered the Gallipoli 
straights knowing the Ottomans were low on 
artillery ammunition.
41
 A British Admiral even 
went as far as to send a cable to Winston Churchill 
before entering the Dardanelles, telling him to 
―expect Allied forces in Istanbul within 14 days‖.42 
This, of course, did not happen and, although 
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Ottoman losses were also very heavy, Allied ground 
forces were unable to make it past the Turkish lines 
on the rocky and steep slopes of Gallipoli.  
 Turkish forces fought gallantly to defend 
every inch of Gallipoli, as Colonel Mustafa Kemal 
ordered his famous lines to his 19
th
 Infantry 
Regiment as they were running low on ammunition, 
―I do not expect you to attack, I order you to die. In 
the time which passes until we die, other troops and 
commanders can come forward and take our 
places.‖43 As allied forces could not make any 
headway in taking control of Gallipoli, the order 
was given to evacuate. British commanders 
expected heavy Allied losses, as many troops were 
dug in extremely close to the Ottoman enemy. 
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However, the most successful Allied operation of 
the entire Gallipoli Campaign was its retreat from 
the peninsula. For all the bad planning and mistakes 
that went into the initial invasion, not one man was 
lost in the Allied retreat, as stealth, careful 
maneuvering, and decoys such as machine guns 
firing without operators (thanks to emptying 
sandbags attached to triggers) allowed Allied troops 
to escape unharmed. 44 
 The aftermath of the Gallipoli Campaign 
was one of excitement and pride for the Turks. 
They had defeated troops from Australia, New 
Zealand, France, and Britain and stopped them from 
taking over Ottoman territory, ultimately forcing the 
allies to abandon their Turkish campaign. This 
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victory also proved to the Turks that they could 
stand up to Europe and support themselves, 
something that they would remember when they 
fought for their independence in the early 1920s. 
Erickson sums up the feeling from a Turkish 
perspective:  
For the Turks the Gallipoli campaign evokes 
the same kinds of memories as Gettysburg, 
the Somme, Verdun, or Leningrad do for the 
Americans, British, French, and Russians, 
respectively. The campaign is also similarly 
embedded in the psyche of the people of 
Australia and New Zealand who continue to 
celebrate Anzac Day.
45
 
 
While it is true that Turks today remember the 
Gallipoli campaign vividly, the same goes for 
Australians and New Zealanders. One might ask 
why such a terrible, costly, and embarrassing defeat 
is still cherished in Australian and New Zealand 
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minds, and it is because this conflict was the first 
time that an independent Australia and New 
Zealand were involved in any conflict as their own 
sovereign power. Although a disaster, these 
countrymen are very proud of their ancestor‘s 
sacrifice, something that is visible every April 25
th
, 
ANZAC Day. 
 In conclusion, the strategic location of 
Gallipoli between the Middle East and Europe had 
made Gallipoli one of the most important places 
within the Ottoman Empire. Whichever group 
claimed control over Gallipoli, whether it be the 
Greeks, the Byzantines, or the Ottomans, often had 
control over the region and could exert their 
influence into adjacent lands. Because the Ottomans 
were able to gain control of Gallipoli, through 
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cunning and help from Mother Nature, they were 
able to expand their empire into Europe, grow at a 
very fast rate, and ultimately rise to become a very 
powerful and dominant empire. Keeping control of 
Gallipoli was central to maintaining power, 
something the Ottomans knew very well, as they 
successfully defended the land from the Byantines, 
Serbs, Hungarians, Venetians, and much later the 
combined forces of the British, French, New 
Zealanders, and Australians.  
The successful defense of Gallipoli in World 
War I also helped propel Mustafa Kemal, the future 
founder of Turkey as an independent country, to an 
icon status. Although Allied forces in World War I 
were unsuccessful in capturing Gallipoli, the 
experience was none the less important to the 
 154 
cultural psyche of Australia, New Zealand, and 
Turkey. Mustafa Kemal accurately described the 
feeling between all nations involved in the Gallipoli 
campaign with these words in 1934:  
Those heroes that shed their blood and lost 
their lives, you are now lying in the soil of a 
friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. 
There is no difference between the Johnnies 
and the Mehmets to us where they lie side 
by side here in this country of ours. You, the 
mothers, who sent their sons from far away 
countries, wipe away your tears; your sons 
are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. 
After having lost their lives on this land they 
have become our sons as well.
46
 
 
In the end, Gallipoli proved to be one of the most 
important – if not the most important – Ottoman 
held territory in its storied existence. Since 
regaining the land in 1377, it has stayed firmly in 
Turkish hands under the Ottomans and later the 
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Republic of Turkey, where it remains today. 
Although there have not been any major battles in 
Gallipoli in many years, the Turks still stand ready, 
knowing that this gateway between Europe and the 
Middle East is still a sought after commodity. 
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The Master of the Senate and the 
Presidential Hidden Hand: Eisenhower, 
Johnson, and Power Dynamics in the 1950s 
by Samuel J. Cooper-Wall 
 
 In March of 2010, renowned architect Frank 
Gehry unveiled his design for a memorial to Dwight 
D. Eisenhower in Washington, D.C. Centered 
around an elaborate layout of stone blocks running 
along a city-block of Maryland Avenue is the 
featured aspect of Gehry‘s design: a narrative 
tapestry of scenes from Eisenhower‘s life. Over 
seven stories tall, the tapestry will impede the view 
of the building located directly behind it. That 
building is the Department of Education, named for 
Lyndon Johnson.
1
 Decades after two of the greatest 
political titans of the twentieth century had passed 
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away, their legacies were still in competition. In 
many ways, then, it is fitting that, as a great 
monument will be laid for Dwight Eisenhower in 
the nation‘s capitol, scholars have begun 
reassessing him as a leader and a president. One 
aspect of his presidency that has needed to be 
reevaluated is his fascinating relationship with 
Johnson. They came from different political parties 
and had different visions for America, yet there was 
a time when circumstances bound them in a 
meaningful, though unstable, political dynamic. For 
six years of his presidency, the moderate 
Republican Eisenhower had to work constructively 
with a Congress dominated by Democrats in order 
to get his agenda passed. As Majority Leader of the 
United States Senate during this period, Johnson 
saw an opportunity to raise the standing of the 
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Democratic Party and his own ambitions for the 
presidency by aligning himself with, and 
occasionally undermining, President Eisenhower. 
Although neither man fully achieved his goals in 
this partnership, it nevertheless proved fruitful for 
both. Their interaction sheds light on them as 
individuals and leaders. Further, a closer inspection 
of many legislative triumphs previously credited to 
Johnson actually contained the artful influence of 
President Eisenhower, proving his political prowess 
applied to Johnson and the legislative process. 
Paths to Power and Finding Common Ground 
 In many ways, the dynamic between these 
two men took shape at their very first meeting. Two 
weeks after Nazi Germany surrendered to the allies, 
Texas Congressman Lyndon B. Johnson received 
permission to take one of his small subcommittees 
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to Europe. Although his travel was under the guise 
of making an evaluation about how the U.S. Navy 
could help support a strong postwar defense effort, 
Johnson was most anxious to view conditions on the 
ground in Europe in order to enhance his credentials 
for taking part in postwar planning. Although 
Commanding General Dwight D. Eisenhower‘s 
staff complained about the timing of Johnson‘s 
visit, Eisenhower himself nevertheless charmed 
Johnson and his colleagues by briefing them about 
conditions in Europe. He also instructed his aides to 
allow Johnson‘s delegation to go wherever they 
desired and to ensure that they had ―a very pleasant 
and wonderful visit.‖2 Johnson benefitted politically 
from the visit, while Eisenhower dutifully and 
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quietly satisfied any obligation he had to those 
public servants. Although neither man could have 
realized it at the time, this encounter foreshadowed 
a future relationship. 
Seven years later Johnson and Eisenhower were 
reunited in the political realm. The election of 1952 
saw Eisenhower win the presidency with the largest 
margin of victory since the landslides of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. His popularity, dating to World War II, 
made him a political star. The Republicans also 
regained a two-seat majority in the Senate. One of 
the Democratic casualties that year was Majority 
Leader Ernest McFarland of Arizona. McFarland‘s 
defeat meant his assistant leader, Lyndon Johnson, 
who had only been in the Senate for four years, was 
now the highest ranking man in the Democratic 
caucus. Despite his inexperience, Johnson began 
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campaigning among his colleagues to be the new 
Minority Leader for the 1953 session of Congress. 
With the support of influential Georgia Senator 
Richard Russell, Johnson got the job; though, at that 
time, there was little competition for the leadership 
of Senate Democrats.
3
 The last two occupants of the 
position had been defeated for reelection while 
trying to defend the increasingly unpopular policies 
of President Harry S. Truman. However, Johnson 
sensed a new opportunity with a popular 
Republican now in the White House: if Democrats 
could align themselves with Eisenhower wherever 
possible, they stood to benefit from his massive 
appeal - an approach seemingly verified by the 
Democratic triumphs in the 1954 midterm elections, 
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which made Johnson Senate Majority Leader.
4
 As a 
result of this mindset, Johnson took pride in 
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Regardless of whatever their motives were, Johnson and 
Rayburn did have a point. And this telegram was not the only 
example of Johnson trying to prove his intentions and abilities 
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supporting aspects of Eisenhower‘s agenda, 
especially foreign policy.
5
 One example was 
                                                                                     
to the President; during a 1957 breakfast meeting with 
Eisenhower, Johnson presented him with papers which 
demonstrated that the current 85th Congressional session had 
spent far more time in session and passed more legislation 
compared to the Republican-controlled 83rd Congress. 
Eisenhower‘s secretary, Ann Whitman, noted in a 
memorandum on the matter that ―The Senator is sensitive, 
apparently, in this respect.‖ See Ann C. Whitman, 
Memorandum of Appointment, 26 August 1957, Ann 
Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 9, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Presidential Library. 
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this afternoon. It was not only marked by great personal 
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Johnson‘s assurance that if the administration would cooperate 
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Johnson‘s quick approval of a measure granting 
Eisenhower full authority to use the U.S. Armed 
Forces in 1955 to defend Taiwanese islands around 
Formosa from Chinese air attacks.
6
 Later, following 
the 1956 election, foreign policy returned as a 
forefront issue during the Suez Crisis, as Britain and 
France launched an assault on the Egyptian military 
on the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal. On 
November 9, 1956, Eisenhower arranged to have 
Congressional leaders briefed about conditions on 
the Sinai, in hopes this would help get approval for 
proposals which increased the chief executive‘s 
authority to handle the American response to the 
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crisis. Eisenhower‘s plan worked perfectly, as 
Johnson found the briefing ―very fruitful and 
helpful‖ and promised he would not play politics 
with foreign policy. By meeting face-to-face with 
Democrats, Eisenhower assured Johnson and other 
Senators that he was firmly in control of the 
situation.
7
 Johnson also supported Eisenhower‘s 
―open skies‖ proposal, calling the plan for the 
superpowers to be able to fly over each other‘s 
nations to observe nuclear armament facilities an 
―imaginative stroke.‖ Johnson further recommended 
an ―open curtain‖ policy, which encouraged the free 
movement of people and ideas between the 
communist and democratic areas of the world 
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without being subjected to suspicion.
8
 Soon after, as 
Johnson lay in a hospital recovering from his first 
heart attack, Eisenhower thanked him for this 
support, writing, ―Thank you ever so much. I am 
greatly pleased by what you had to say. I do hope 
you are rapidly improving.‖9 This gracious and 
respectful tone found in their early correspondence 
was symbolic of their meaningful efforts to 
cooperate on critical foreign policy issues in the 
first years of the Eisenhower Administration. 
Johnson‘s alignment with the President was 
necessitated by the latter‘s obvious popularity, still 
strong even a decade after World War II ended. As 
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long as Eisenhower was doing well in the polls, 
Johnson was likely to support him. As Eisenhower‘s 
reelection approached in 1956, Johnson‘s support 
for the President was remarkably nonpartisan in 
nature. In fact, Johnson was careful to avoid 
criticizing the President, because, as Doris Kearns 
wrote, ―Johnson felt that to attack Eisenhower 
would be ‗like telling children that their father was 
a bad man . . . ‘‖10 Johnson took specific action to 
appease the President, including allocating an 
additional five million dollars for the Overseas 
Information Program after Eisenhower placed a call 
to him on the matter in May of 1956.
11
 With such 
action, Johnson‘s standing with Eisenhower grew. 
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As the campaign of 1956 neared, Eisenhower even 
believed the Democrats might nominate Johnson to 
run against him. In his memoirs, Eisenhower 
observed that Johnson would have ―. . . had better 
vote-getting power‖ than the actual nominee, Adlai 
Stevenson.
12
 For his part, Johnson viewed the 
President‘s reelection as inevitable. Sid Richardson 
reported to Eisenhower on November 8th that 
Johnson had told him that ―The President is going 
to carry Texas . . . and I am going to continue to 
work with him.‖13 Eisenhower not only carried 
Texas, but won in a landslide greater than that of his 
first campaign. However, the close cooperation 
between the two politicians had already reached its 
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apex. Johnson‘s biographer Robert Dallek explained 
that in Eisenhower‘s second term, ―Johnson was 
reluctant to abandon the bipartisanship that he 
believed had served the country and congressional 
Democrats during Ike‘s first term. But pressure 
from liberals, a defense of congressional 
prerogatives, and genuine differences over Middle 
East policy pushed him into a conflict with Ike,‖ 
and the result was Johnson‘s allegiance to 
Eisenhower waning over the rest of the decade.
14
 
For the Democratic leader, this strategy appeared 
quite wise, but what he had failed to anticipate, and 
what some scholars have failed to grasp, was how 
Eisenhower in turn used Johnson to his own 
political advantage. 
Eisenhower‘s Approach to Johnson and Congress 
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 In order to more fully understand this 
dynamic, historiographical conclusions must be 
analyzed and reevaluated. Chief among them is the 
perception of President Eisenhower as ―. . . an aging 
hero who reigned more than he ruled and lacked the 
energy, motivation, and political know-how to have 
a significant impact on events.‖15 Originally the 
view of cynical liberals in the 1950s, it had made its 
way into early historical analysis of Eisenhower and 
public perception about the President. Modern 
scholars, such as Fred Greenstein, have discovered 
that Eisenhower was a far more devious and clever 
strategist than his critics had assumed. In fact, he 
employed a shrewd ―hidden-hand‖ methodology 
which concealed a great deal of his leadership 
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initiatives while enabling him room to maneuver 
within the political system.
16
 Akin to many aspects 
of his presidency, Eisenhower‘s interactions with 
Congress typically invoked a philosophy derived 
from this hidden-hand style of leadership. It was a 
multi-faceted approach that, interestingly enough, 
had a similar concept as that of an extensive study 
written by Democratic attorney James Rowe for 
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Harry Truman after the Republican Party won both 
houses of Congress in the 1946 midterm elections. 
Rowe‘s report ended up in Eisenhower‘s White 
House files after Truman left office, though there is 
no evidence that Eisenhower himself ever read it. 
That said, many of Rowe‘s recommendations were 
also part of Eisenhower‘s strategy and it serves as a 
valuable lens for further examining the tactics of 
President Eisenhower.  
 Rowe laid out historical precedents for his 
conclusions concerning the success of Presidential 
dealings with Congress. He noted that Presidents 
such as Grover Cleveland and William Howard Taft 
tended not to vocally berate Congressional 
opposition, since this kind of behavior often harmed 
the President and his reputation more than his 
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targets.
17
 Eisenhower avoided such confrontations 
by limiting his criticism of Congress in public. 
Rarely did an intense disagreement between 
Eisenhower and Johnson become news or public 
knowledge. Eisenhower‘s kindness and diplomacy 
shown in many interactions with Johnson certainly 
signaled a legitimate feeling that the President 
preferred Johnson as a friend, not an enemy.
18
 This 
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attitude was very much unlike Herbert Hoover, for 
example, who became so ―publicly argumentative‖ 
with Congress that it approved little of his agenda. 
To ease or prevent tension, Rowe viewed personal 
meetings with opposition leaders as significant 
gestures toward cooperation. Indeed, scheduling 
records indicate that Eisenhower occasionally 
breakfasted with the Senate Democratic leader and 
regularly invited Johnson and House Speaker Sam 
Rayburn to private evening meetings at the White 
House. Rowe also recommended that the President 
should ―act and speak at all times in terms of public 
welfare and not as partisan.‖19 The Congress would 
be more likely to support the President whenever he 
has popular support on his side. According to Rowe, 
                                                                                     
the same cub, so to speak.‖ See Wilton B. Persons Oral 
History, OH #334, DDEL. 
19
 Rowe, ―Cooperation or Conflict,‖ 25. 
 175 
―The history of every administration shows that in 
the final analysis a President has but one weapon: 
public opinion.‖20 Eisenhower was accustomed to 
this practice as well, partially because he knew his 
intentions far better than those of many 
Congressmen. As Eisenhower once confided to 
friend Edward ―Swede‖ Hazlett, ―In the general 
case each [member of Congress] thinks of himself 
as intensely patriotic; but it does not take the 
average member long to conclude that his first duty 
to his country is to get himself re-elected.‖21 
Eisenhower accused Johnson and others of such 
pettiness, but was fortunate that he himself had a 
degree of popularity which left little doubt to his 
reelection. Although he was never able to bring 
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Republican majorities back into either house 
following their loss of power in the 1954 midterms, 
Eisenhower proved capable of working with 
Johnson and the Democratic Congress. 
 Another significant method Eisenhower 
employed specifically on Johnson was the use of 
intermediaries. Some were congressional allies, 
who kept tabs on the Senate Democratic leader. 
This was one assignment in which Republican 
leader William Knowland, who did not often hold 
the confidence of the President, was particularly 
useful. With his desk on the Senate floor right 
across the center aisle from Johnson, Knowland was 
ideally situated to be able to gather some 
information to pass along to Eisenhower, including 
a possible rift between Johnson and his mentor, 
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Sam Rayburn, in 1957.
22
 Two specific men, though, 
managed the job best. In the early days of the 
presidency, the primary go-between was Sid 
Richardson. The Texas millionaire made his fortune 
in oil, and he and Eisenhower had been friends for 
over twenty years. He also was a financial 
contributor to both the President and Johnson, 
making him the ideal person to discreetly handle 
Johnson on Eisenhower‘s behalf. Eisenhower, with 
counsel from Treasury Secretary George 
Humphrey, used Richardson to encourage Johnson 
to support the administration‘s policy wherever 
possible. In one instance Eisenhower had a hand in 
plans to suggest Richardson threaten support for a 
primary election challenge to Johnson from Texas 
Governor Allen Shivers in 1954 unless the 
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Democratic leader got on board with certain 
Eisenhower policies.
23
  
 After Richardson‘s death in 1959, 
Eisenhower‘s second Treasury Secretary, Robert 
Anderson, another Texan, stepped in to the role. 
When reflecting on this experience in a letter to 
Johnson several months after Eisenhower‘s death, 
Anderson recalled that this liaison was established 
―. . . on the basis of preserving completely the 
[Democratic] party integrity and the absolute right 
of dissent, but so that we did not confront either the 
Administration or the Congressional leadership with 
surprise suggestions which might not be in our 
national interest either politically or economically.‖ 
Anderson also remembered that the information 
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discussed by the President or Johnson with him 
would be kept confidential from the cabinet, though 
he did reserve the right to report anything Johnson 
told him to Eisenhower. Lastly, Anderson 
nostalgically noted the ―free exchange‖ of ideas 
between them, and how their relationship was much 
stronger than future presidents with Congressional 
leaders, including John Kennedy‘s relationship with 
Everett Dirksen, Johnson‘s with Dirksen (in the 
1960s), or Nixon‘s with Congressional Democrats 
in the early 1970s. Although Anderson may have 
idealized the Eisenhower-Johnson relationship as he 
wrote to his fellow Texan so many years after the 
fact, he was certainly in a position to see the 
cordiality and respect the two showed for each 
other.
24
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 The use of intermediaries was a creative 
tactic on Eisenhower‘s part, but probably even more 
effective were his more personal meetings with 
Johnson, an approach highlighted in the Rowe 
Report. Even when the Democrats were the 
minority party in Congress, Eisenhower invited 
Johnson and Rayburn to the White House to talk 
policy and politics over drinks and light 
refreshments. The three were comfortable talking 
with each other in this setting and were able to bond 
over the fact that they were all born Texans (though 
Eisenhower was raised in Kansas).
25
 Most 
importantly, these meetings surely allowed 
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Eisenhower to get a better sense of Johnson‘s 
persona and character, and thus allowing him to 
more easily take the pulse of his so-called ―loyal 
opposition‖ in Congress.26  
 Overall, these tactics proved essential for 
Eisenhower over the six year period in which the 
President and the powerful Majority Leader worked 
to guide the legislative process. Johnson was 
obsessed with public approval and press attention. 
Eisenhower understood Johnson‘s motives in this 
regard, and privately referred to the Democratic 
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leader as a ―phony.‖27 Eisenhower also displayed no 
inclination to trust Johnson, as the Majority Leader 
clearly wanted Eisenhower‘s job and would employ 
devious political strategies to get it. Yet, no matter 
the degree to which Eisenhower detested Johnson‘s 
―superficial and opportunistic‖ qualities, the 
President was aware of his own popularity and how 
this could be used as leverage over the Senate 
leader.
28
 It was also clear to Eisenhower that he 
would need the help of Democrats to pass his 
agenda, which was not conservative enough to suit 
the Taft wing of the Republican Party. To achieve 
Democratic support, Eisenhower treated Johnson 
with great respect, even placing him on five-person 
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committee which would be tasked with determining 
his (Eisenhower‘s) own fitness to continue in office 
should his health severely deteriorate or if an 
ailment, such as a stroke, limited his mental 
capacities.
29
  
 Eisenhower‘s tactics, right down to his 
efforts to accommodate Johnson‘s ego, as well as 
his incredible patience which the Democratic 
leader, showed how effective the President was at 
managing and even manipulating what could have 
been a bitter adversary into a respectful opponent 
and a partial ally. And while his tactics were 
inventive if not brilliant, comparatively few 
scholars have assessed Eisenhower‘s subtle role in 
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the crucial legislative issues of the day. As a result, 
the stereotype of Eisenhower as a passive president 
persists. To better understand Eisenhower and 
Johnson‘s relationship and comparative powers, a 
more complete picture is required. Several 
significant case studies, ranging throughout the 
Presidency, serve to enhance Eisenhower‘s true role 
in this dynamic. Taken together, they represent each 
man‘s strengths and power.  
Early Cooperation and the Emergence of 
Eisenhower‘s Leadership Abilities 
 ―We are in the minority,‖ Johnson told the 
Senate Democratic Conference after assuming the 
party leadership in early 1953, adding ―I have never 
agreed with the statement that it is ‗the business of 
the opposition to oppose.‘ I do not believe the 
American people have sent us here merely to 
 185 
obstruct.‖30 Knowing full well that it was not in his 
own best interest to make an enemy in Eisenhower, 
Johnson supported the President where practicable. 
Johnson moved quickly to extend the olive branch 
to Eisenhower by accepting the nominees for the 
Presidential cabinet, declaring ―I am anxious to 
cooperate with the President in carrying out his 
mandate. Unless there is a violation of some 
important principle, I believe the President should 
have around him the men he has selected.‖31 One of 
the most contentious nominees needed Johnson‘s 
help the most. Eisenhower had selected Charles 
―Chip‖ Bohlen to be Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union in April 1953. Bohlen was a career diplomat 
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with experience in dealing with the Soviets, but 
anticommunist maverick Senator Joseph R. 
McCarthy vehemently opposed Bohlen‘s 
confirmation because the latter had taken part in the 
Yalta Conference, which had yielded sections of 
Germany and the city of Berlin to Soviet influence. 
In addition, McCarthy implied that Bohlen was as a 
homosexual and demanded access to Bohlen‘s FBI 
file.
32
 Eisenhower denied McCarthy access to the 
file but allowed it to be reviewed by Senate 
Majority Leader Robert Taft, who found in it 
nothing worthy of disqualifying Bohlen. On the 
Senate floor Johnson defended Bohlen, and accused 
McCarthy and his supporters of questioning the 
integrity of President Eisenhower. With support 
from Johnson and the Democrats, Bohlen was 
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confirmed in a 74 to 13 vote. As a result, Johnson 
knew he and the Democrats benefitted from this 
issue while the Republicans seemed divided. Not 
for the last time, Johnson got good press and 
Eisenhower got what he wanted out of the Senate.
33
  
A Common Enemy: Right-Wing Senators 
 At the beginning of the 1953 session of 
Congress, conservative Ohio Senator John Bricker 
offered an amendment limiting the President‘s 
power to conduct foreign affairs by granting 
authority to Congress to approve international 
compacts and treaties and by restricting the 
President from making any treaty which violated 
the Constitution. Eisenhower did not feel that such 
an amendment was truly necessary, but saw nothing 
wrong with its premise, which was ―. . . a 
reaffirmation of the supremacy of our Constitution 
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and the right of Congress, under the Constitution, to 
annul by subsequent act of its own any provision of 
any treaty.‖34 However, the President made clear he 
thought the language of the Bricker Amendment 
tied the president‘s hands and ―. . . would be notice 
to our friends as well as our enemies abroad that our 
country intends to withdraw from its leadership in 
world affairs . . . It would impair our hopes and 
plans for peace and for the successful achievement 
of the important international matters now under 
discussion.‖35 Bricker‘s proposal appeared to be 
subtly criticizing the United Nations by declaring 
that it would not permit international organizations 
from controlling or adjudicating the rights of 
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American citizens.
36
 Eisenhower and Attorney 
General Herbert Brownell tried to convince Bricker 
to delay the Senate‘s consideration of his proposal, 
but Bricker introduced it anyway, and signed on 
sixty-three other senators as cosponsors. In turn, 
Eisenhower worked with Republican leader 
William Knowland to introduce what was called the 
Knowland Substitute for the Bricker Amendment. 
Essentially, though, this was Eisenhower‘s 
counterproposal, simply reaffirming the Senate‘s 
ability to ratify all foreign treaties.
37
  
 However, Lyndon Johnson soon managed to 
develop a more popular alternative to Bricker. 
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Johnson considered the Bricker Amendment an 
insult to former Democratic Presidents Roosevelt 
and Truman, not to mention an impediment if he 
himself ever became president. Yet, he was also 
under a great deal of pressure because most 
southern Democrats supported Bricker, as did Sid 
Richardson.
38
 Johnson, in this case, showed his 
political cunning by meeting with Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles, and asking Dulles to convince 
Eisenhower to publicly denounce Bricker‘s 
Amendment.
39
 Most importantly, though, Johnson 
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convinced Democratic Senator Walter George to 
propose a more moderate alternative to Bricker‘s 
measure. George‘s motion dictated that 
international treaties could not become law if they 
violated the Constitution, and all United Nations 
Charters and Executive agreements (but not formal 
treaties) required approval by Congress. Johnson, 
though, wanted the George Resolution to fail as 
well, but by a closer and more respectable margin. 
Johnson hoped the George Resolution would draw 
some conservatives from Bricker and, if George 
failed, he hoped the issue might be laid to rest.
40
 
Eisenhower himself might have accepted the 
George Amendment, but again felt such an 
amendment was not necessary. He also feared its 
passage might make it appear that the Democrats 
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had once again saved his administration. Yet, as 
historian Daune Tananbaum noted, this was hardly 
the reality; in fact Eisenhower ―. . . played an active 
role in the deliberations within the administration 
and the efforts to work out a compromise with 
Senator George and the Democrats and the 
Republican leaders.‖41 On February 26, 1954, both 
amendments were up for a vote. Bricker‘s only 
garnered forty-two votes to fifty in opposition. 
George received sixty votes, but thirty-one opposed 
him, which kept the amendment from meeting the 
required support from the two-thirds of the Senate.
42
 
Johnson had apparently executed the voting exactly 
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to his desire and received the credit he sought from 
the press. What the press missed was how 
Republican dissent from the George Resolution 
effectively showcased Eisenhower‘s influence, as 
thirteen moderate ―Eisenhower Republicans‖ voted 
against George, because, as Tananbaum noted, ―of 
the administration‘s objections.‖43 Scholars have 
looked to the Bricker debate to prove Johnson‘s 
prowess as Majority Leader, and, for that matter, his 
ability to calculate votes and hold Democratic 
support exactly where he wanted it should give him 
notable credit for diffusing Bricker. As the ―master 
of the Senate,‖ Johnson deserves no less. Still, 
Eisenhower worked his own influence behind the 
scenes (and in public, wherever necessary), and 
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played a critical role in working towards the goal, 
which, on this occasion, he and Johnson shared. 
 The debate over the Bricker Amendment 
was only a momentary interruption in the saga of 
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. As McCarthy‘s 
committee began hearings with the U.S. Army in 
early 1954, Johnson kept silent. He feared a 
Democratic assault against McCarthy would unite 
the Republicans and make the notorious Wisconsin 
senator a partisan issue. As Johnson put it, ―. . . why 
put on the brave act, beat one‘s chest, and net 
twenty-five votes against Joe, and in turn get 
smeared and unite the Republicans behind Joe.‖44 
Although Democrats and Johnson approved 
McCarthy‘s censure, it was Eisenhower‘s efforts to 
subtly undermine McCarthy that had greater 
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influence in slowly, but surely, securing 
McCarthy‘s downfall.45 United Nations 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge later wrote that in 
a meeting on January 21, 1954, Eisenhower laid out 
a clever strategy based on televising the upcoming 
Army-McCarthy hearings. Figuring the hearings 
would not go well for McCarthy, Eisenhower then 
arranged for Vermont Senator Ralph Flanders to 
call for McCarthy‘s censure. This move ultimately 
triggered an investigative committee which 
recommended censure to the entire Senate body. 
Eisenhower‘s plan moved cautiously, but its result 
indicated that Eisenhower was just as crafty as the 
wily Johnson.
46
 Johnson, though, worked 
effectively as well, wherever he thought he could 
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help to undermine McCarthy. Especially when, 
prior to his censure, McCarthy introduced a 
resolution limiting presidential ability to negotiate 
within the ―Big Four‖ powers (Great Britain, 
France, the Soviet Union, and the United States). 
Johnson countered McCarthy‘s attention-getting 
ploy by quickly bringing it to a vote on the floor, 
where it was struck down. Eisenhower privately 
celebrated the result, saying ―McCarthyism‖ had 
been reduced to ―McCarthywasm.‖47 Thus, while 
Johnson and Eisenhower did not necessarily work 
jointly, they again had a common goal in seeing 
McCarthy‘s influence ended, and aided each other 
by both working towards it.  
Playing Politics: Cracks in the Partnership 
 During the second term, their dynamic 
shifted significantly. The two shared fewer goals as 
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Johnson was no longer satisfied helping the 
President‘s agenda, but instead wanted to advance 
one of his own -  an agenda which benefitted him 
the most. Johnson‘s change of heart, however, 
allowed Eisenhower to prove his true leadership 
ability in Congress, through issues like civil rights 
in 1957. Based on proposals made by Attorney 
General Herbert Brownell in 1956, proposals which 
never made it to the Senate floor, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1957 would be the most critical piece of 
legislation debated by the Congress that year. This 
came about, according to Brownell, thanks to 
Illinois Senator Paul Douglas, who managed to 
―extract‖ a promise from Johnson which assured 
civil rights would be considered early in the 1957 
session.
48
 Then Vice President Richard Nixon, 
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Republican Leader William Knowland, and 
Brownell arranged for Knowland to bring the act to 
the Senate floor directly, where Nixon, as the 
presiding officer, authorized the bill for 
consideration by the full Senate, thus allowing the 
act to avoid first being sent to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, where Chairman James Eastland, a 
vehement supporter of segregation, would certainly 
have killed it. By employing an obscure Senate rule, 
these members of Eisenhower‘s team managed to 
advance the measure. Kept uninformed of this 
maneuver, Johnson and other southerners in the 
Senate denounced the scheme as unfair.
49
 The 
provisions of Brownell and Eisenhower‘s Act 
established a Civil Rights Commission, created a 
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Civil Rights Division at the Justice Department, 
authorized the Attorney General to bring charges 
against voting rights discrimination, and guaranteed 
no jury trials for civil rights violators (as all-white 
juries typically acquitted those charged with civil 
rights violations). Johnson allowed debate to begin 
on the bill, but remained neutral on it.
50
 Johnson 
wanted a mild civil rights act that would pacify his 
caucus of Democrats which was becoming 
increasingly fractured between liberals and 
conservatives.
51
 Johnson argued that the bill would 
not be passed if the clause giving the Attorney 
General authority in regards to voting rights 
remained in the legislation. This codicil infuriated 
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the President, who already saw the bill as a 
compromise solution. Nevertheless, Eisenhower 
agreed to withdraw his support for that clause.
52
 As 
Brownell insisted, Eisenhower had to be practical.
53
 
However, historian David Nichols questioned 
whether Eisenhower knew some of these provisions 
would fail and used them as bargaining tools against 
Johnson and the southern Democrats.
54
  
 Johnson, however, weakened the Civil 
Rights Act further by proposing an amendment 
which would have guaranteed jury trials to those 
accused of committing civil rights violations. 
Johnson took this action to ease the fears of 
southerners about the Act. Angered, Eisenhower 
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considered scrapping the entire Act.
55
 Instead, 
Eisenhower and newly sworn-in Attorney General 
William Rogers used their influence on Capitol Hill 
to reach a compromise with Johnson and the 
Democrats on the Act‘s final language, which 
dictated that the specifics of a case would determine 
whether defendants would have a jury trial.
56
 The 
compromise provided that as long as a defendant 
faced no more than a three-hundred dollar fine and 
a jail sentence of forty-five days (reduced from 
ninety), no jury would be gathered.
57
 Despite a 
twenty-four hour filibuster by Senator Strom 
Thurmond, the first Civil Rights Act was passed by 
Congress and signed by the President in late 
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August. Johnson took credit for the bill, while all of 
the efforts of Eisenhower and his subordinates were 
less obvious by comparison.
58
 Johnson had walked 
a tight-rope between a crusader for civil rights who 
would soon be seeking the presidency and a 
pragmatic senator trying not to lose the support of 
his southern delegation. Regardless of who received 
credit for the bill, clearly Johnson was not the ally 
he used to be for Eisenhower. 
 The remainder of 1957 only worsened their 
relationship. Back in May, Johnson and the Senate 
had cut funding for the United States Information 
Agency (USIA), a critical aspect of the President‘s 
propaganda efforts. Eisenhower wrote Johnson, ―I 
am very disappointed that in this instance you found 
it desirable to reduce rather than to increase the 
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pressure of our effort [with the USIA] . . . it is still 
difficult for me to understand why this vital weapon 
in our arsenal would be blunted at this critical 
juncture in world affairs.‖59 Johnson also opposed 
Eisenhower‘s decision to send the 101st Airborne 
Division to Little Rock High School for the 
enforcement of school desegregation. Johnson 
remarked, ―There should be no troops from either 
side patrolling our school campuses.‖60 Later, as the 
1957 session drew to a close, Congress appropriated 
only $2.7 billion of the $3.8 billion in funding 
Eisenhower had requested for mutual security 
programs. Looking back, Eisenhower sourly 
concluded, ―The 1957 session marked the low point 
in effective cooperation between the administration 
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and the Congress.‖61 The situation looked no better 
in 1958. 
Space Race Initiatives 
As much as the Senate suited him, Johnson‘s 
life‘s desire was to be president, and Eisenhower‘s 
closed-door methods sometimes allowed an 
uncooperative Johnson to act the part. A notable 
example followed the Soviet Union‘s October 1, 
1957 launch of Sputnik, the first satellite to orbit the 
earth. As described by Johnson‘s aide George 
Reedy, Sputnik stunned the American public and 
fueled fears that the United States was now falling 
behind in the technological battle of the Cold War. 
Eisenhower, according to Reedy, dismissed Sputnik 
as an expensive ―toy.‖62 Eisenhower did tell the 
press, ―As far as the satellite is concerned, that does 
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not raise my apprehensions [about the Soviet 
Union], not one iota. I can see nothing at this 
moment, at this stage of development, that is 
significant . . .  as far as security is concerned.‖63 
However, Eisenhower‘s words were surely spoken 
with a desire to calm the fears of the public, and not 
out of ignorance, as Reedy implied. Nevertheless, 
using his seat of the Senate Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Preparedness as his platform, 
Johnson brought in scientists to testify about the 
importance of understanding and traveling in outer 
space. Johnson then introduced the National 
Aeronautic and Space Act before the Senate during 
the 1958 session. This piece of legislation 
established the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), a national civilian space 
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agency. To cap off his efforts, Johnson delivered a 
nationally televised speech about the need for 
exploration in space, in a performance which some 
called his first ―State of the Union‖ address. 
Overall, Reedy wrote, ―The picture was that of a 
president ignoring what many people regarded as 
the greatest crisis in centuries while the Senate 
Democratic leader was working night and day to 
mobilize the nation to meet the challenge.‖ This 
situation further enhanced the argument that the real 
power in Washington lay with Lyndon Johnson, as 
some Americans began to ask if this was the man 
who was really running the country.
64
 However, 
Reedy conveniently excluded from his narrative an 
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executive message from Eisenhower to Congress a 
full two months before the Space Act passed. It was 
this message which formally proposed the creation 
of NASA.
65
 In fact, any hesitation from the White 
House towards the Space Act was not derived from 
opposition to NASA itself, but rather due to 
objections concerning the creation of a seven-
member policy board for the federal space agency. 
Eisenhower and his advisors felt the board was in 
conflict ―with the concept of a single head [of 
NASA] directly responsible to the President,‖ and 
was likely to divide responsibilities, and make it 
―difficult to hold anyone accountable for results.‖66 
Clearly Eisenhower was not unconcerned with 
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satellites and space exploration and even had his 
own recommendations on the matter.
67
 To resolve 
the issue, Eisenhower arranged a private meeting 
with Johnson and convinced the Majority Leader to 
replace the policy board with an advisory group, 
which gave greater authority over NASA to the 
President.
68
 With these facts in mind, and though 
Johnson was the crucial force in establishing the 
space agency, Reedy‘s assessment of Eisenhower as 
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an unconcerned and out-of-touch president, an 
impression some historians embraced, is proven 
inaccurate.  
A Most Shameful Day and the End of Cooperation 
 Eisenhower, however, was not destined to 
always emerge victorious when he and Johnson 
were not aligned. By 1959, Johnson‘s and 
Eisenhower‘s interactions had become much more 
limited. On June 25 Eisenhower had sent Johnson a 
strongly worded letter urging him, in the name of 
protecting the nation‘s classified information, to 
withhold a resolution permitting Congress to 
investigate national security agencies up to their 
highest levels of authority. What is most striking 
about the letter, though, is that Eisenhower no 
longer addresses it ―Dear Lyndon‖ (as was 
customary with earlier correspondence), but a more 
 210 
formal ―Dear Senator Johnson,‖ suggesting that 
their partnership was now more distant.
69
 George 
Reedy, for one, noticed Eisenhower was applying 
the veto power much more frequently. 
70
 Conditions 
reached a boiling point when Eisenhower 
nominated former Atomic Energy Commission 
member Lewis Strauss to be Secretary of 
Commerce. Strauss, though, had already clashed 
with Congressional Democrats while serving on the 
commission.
71
 Although Johnson was publicly 
undecided about Strauss until the day of the 
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confirmation vote in June, he had worked covertly 
to gain the support of Republicans William Langer 
and Margaret Chase Smith to oppose Strauss.
72
 
Always the master of surprises, Johnson brought the 
confirmation to a vote rather unexpectedly on June 
18th, when three Republican Senators were out of 
town and one could not return in time (Eisenhower 
dispatched two Air Force planes to pick-up the 
other two).
73
 Johnson‘s scheme had made all the 
difference as Strauss was voted down by a 49-46 
margin. No better example illustrates Johnson‘s 
greatest advantage over Eisenhower: the power he 
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held over the Senate. Regardless of how the 
President tried to influence or sway him, Johnson 
had his own methods of persuading or controlling 
his fellow senators. In the end, it was fairly often 
the case that Johnson made the final call on issues 
like the Strauss nomination. Eisenhower, on the 
other hand, was simply enraged by the final vote, 
declaring ―this is the most shameful day in Senate 
history [since the attempt to impeach Andrew 
Johnson in the 1868].‖74 Privately, he consoled 
Strauss by writing him, ―I believe that all those 
members of the Senate who voted against your 
confirmation will eventually come to reflect with 
deep regret upon the day they decided to refuse 
confirmation to one whose reputation for courage, 
integrity, and good judgment makes him one of our 
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distinguished Americans.‖75 Johnson was deeply 
offended by Eisenhower‘s criticism, and barely 
spoke with the President until he received a call 
from Eisenhower ―apologizing for any 
misunderstanding.‖76 Still, the damage was done 
and the Strauss nomination appeared to join the 
Bohlen nomination in 1953 as bookends for the 
Eisenhower-Johnson dynamic, as essentially one 
opened and the other closed the relationship. As 
Johnson planned to seek his party‘s nomination in 
1960, any remaining camaraderie between the two 
faded. Johnson, as the next presidential election 
neared, distanced himself from Eisenhower, and the 
President was growing exhausted with Johnson‘s 
political games. 
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 In March of 1960 the two managed to 
cooperate for one last significant compromise, a 
second Civil Rights Act. Eisenhower‘s version of 
the act would have been an indirect endorsement of 
the 1954 Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board 
of Education of Topeka.
77
 Johnson, though, 
garnered enough support to pull education grants 
from the act. However, Eisenhower refused to 
concede a clause which allowed federal authorities 
to inspect voter registration lists and assess 
penalties if cases of clear discrimination arose. 
After eighteen southern senators filibustered for 
one-hundred and twenty-five hours, the longest in 
Senate history, Johnson broke the filibuster and the 
Senate passed the Civil Rights Act. Once more, 
Johnson received much of the publicity and credit 
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while Eisenhower was the silent force behind the 
legislation.
78
 Following the final vote, Republican 
Congressional Leaders complained to Eisenhower 
during one of their many meetings with the 
President that they were upset by Johnson‘s 
coverage in the media. Exasperated as well, 
Eisenhower admitted, ―I don‘t know what to do - 
but I get annoyed about [the credit going to 
Johnson] . . . Except for this political game, I 
wouldn‘t care who gets credit for something that‘s 
good to have.‖79 Few statements better summarize 
this position, which Eisenhower held consistently 
throughout his tenure. Months later the approach of 
the 1960 election brought these ill feelings between 
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the two to a fever-pitch. At one of his stag dinners 
in late July, Eisenhower was asked by members of 
the press to name several Democrats whom he 
respected and who might be nominated to succeed 
him as president. Eisenhower listed Senators John 
Stennis of Mississippi, Spessard Holland of Florida, 
and Frank Lausche of Ohio. Reporters were quick 
to note the absence of Johnson from the President‘s 
―recommendations,‖ though based their increased 
hostilities during Eisenhower‘s second term, this 
should not have been surprising. The President even 
refused the suggestion of his aide Bryce Harlow to 
mention Johnson‘s name after the fact. Ann 
Whitman noted, ―The President brushed the 
[suggestion] off, saying that Johnson had made 
some comments much worse about him . . .‖ The 
result was an awkward meeting between 
 217 
Eisenhower, Johnson, Rayburn, and Harlow on 
August 3
rd
. Meant to be another simple private chat 
to discuss Congressional matters, the gathering was 
marked by Johnson giving the President the silent 
treatment. In the aftermath of these events, Robert 
Anderson went to meet with Johnson while 
Eisenhower‘s own Congressional liaison fractured 
as Harlow accused Wilton Persons and Press 
Secretary James Hagerty of ―poisoning the 
President‘s mind‖ against Johnson and firmly 
declared that Johnson would make the best 
president out of any Democrat.‖80  
 Ultimately, the point was moot as Johnson 
had been nominated by the Democrats for the Vice 
Presidency several weeks earlier, but was 
significant in that these events acknowledged that 
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the relationship between the President and the 
Senate Majority Leader had ended. Congress was 
soon in recess for the election season, which saw 
Eisenhower make a multi-state campaign tour on 
behalf of Nixon‘s Presidential campaign. Once 
more, Eisenhower and Johnson were on completely 
opposed sides, this time in one of the most 
contentious presidential elections of the twentieth 
century. No other reason so effectively 
demonstrated why their partnership could not 
endure, for they ultimately had party allegiances 
that, at their core, made them political adversaries. 
The Common Experience of the Presidency 
 Following Senator John Kennedy‘s triumph 
over Nixon in the election, Eisenhower sent 
telegrams to the candidates on both parties‘ national 
tickets. The shortest, just a one sentence message of 
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congratulations, was sent to Vice President-elect 
Johnson.
81
 Whatever remained of their relationship 
seemingly mattered little, as both Johnson and 
Eisenhower would soon face new positions, 
especially as the latter would shortly be leaving 
public service for retirement. 
 Neither Eisenhower nor Johnson received all 
of what they wanted out of their relationship. 
Eisenhower did not get all of his administration‘s 
agenda passed, and Johnson was obviously not 
elected president in 1960. Yet, a firm portion of the 
Eisenhower Administration‘s agenda was enacted 
and Johnson would become president in time. 
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Ultimately, Johnson was far easier for Eisenhower 
to work with then many Democrats and even certain 
Republicans such as Bricker, McCarthy, and 
Knowland. Additionally, Eisenhower‘s sometimes 
covert leadership allowed Johnson to get the press 
and praise he craved. Together, they managed to 
share power in a political chess game for 
Eisenhower‘s entire tenure (six years of which 
found the Senate controlled by Johnson and the 
Democrats) with only minimal public spats. Their 
relationship, interestingly, would greatly improve in 
the 1960s as Eisenhower became a valuable 
supporter of President Johnson as armed conflict in 
the country of Vietnam intensified with the 
dramatic escalation of U.S. forces. Their partnership 
during the 1950s, even at its best moments, had 
never been close. It was, some argued, the common 
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experience of the being President which aided their 
reconciliation. 
 History still judges their respective legacies. 
Their philosophies were different and their methods 
were nearly polar opposites, but together they 
helped the government function in meaningful ways 
throughout the 1950s. This story is also a small part 
of a larger narrative about Eisenhower and his 
leadership. For someone who entered the 
presidency with no legislative experience, 
Eisenhower was quick to grasp the challenges and 
opportunities it presented him as president, 
including the savvy Democratic leader whom 
Eisenhower had to flatter, appease, pressure, and 
take-to-task in order to achieve the amount of 
success with Congress he wanted. The fact that 
Eisenhower learned to deal with Johnson, regardless 
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of whether the Majority Leader was being helpful, 
stubborn, or manipulative, said something about the 
President‘s ability to grasp the inner-workings of 
partisan politics. Ultimately, Johnson was a fairly 
open book to Eisenhower; he knew what the Texan 
wanted and how devious he was in his efforts at 
political domination and self-promotion. One must 
imagine the disadvantage lay with Senator Johnson, 
who appeared unable to fully comprehend the 
motives of the private, calculated, and cautious 
Eisenhower, which was a tribute to the President‘s 
methodology for governing: a popular confidence 
with a quiet but powerful presence of authority.
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The Quiet War: Nazi Agents in America 
By Robert Kellert 
 
In the summer of 1942, the East Coast bore 
witness to an aberration when a German submarine 
appeared in the waters off Long Island, seemingly 
countless miles from the bitter fighting and utter 
carnage engulfing Europe.
1
 Only four days later, 
another submarine unexpectedly surfaced, this time 
near Ponte Vedra Beach off the coast of Florida.
2
 
The United States, historically protected from its 
enemies abroad by the vast stretches of the mighty 
Atlantic, now found itself exposed to the 
Unterseeboote that had once provoked the 
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superpower into world war.
3
 The submarines 
harbored agents of the notorious German spy 
organization known as the Abwehr; and while these 
agents‘ ultimate capture epitomized the failure of 
many German intelligence operations in the United 
States, their activity reaffirmed American fears of 
Nazi spies and American subversives within. 
Beyond its immediate impact, Operation 
PASTORIUS inadvertently led the United States 
government to reflect on the legal treatment of its 
enemies—an issue that, more than sixty years later, 
remains to be resolved.    
The Abwehr, whose name is derived from 
the German word for ―defense,‖ was hardly a 
defensive organization. A military intelligence 
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agency spearheaded by the ―almost legendary‖ 
Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the Abwehr flourished 
under the leadership of Canaris, who made it 
immediately clear—as early as 1935—that the 
United States would be ―‗one of the [Abwehr‘s] key 
targets.‘‖4  
The United States, adhering to its 
isolationist doctrine and in the midst of an economic 
depression, still seemed to threaten Germany‘s 
interests in the near future. Nazi Germany appeared 
both aware of, and concerned with, America‘s 
ability to exert its diplomatic and military influence 
on the world stage six years before its entrance into 
World War II. Canaris, for one, recognized the 
―‗capacity of its [America‘s] industrial power‘‖ to 
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―‗assure victory.‘‖5 Thus, responding to the earliest 
portents of global conflict, Germany was preparing 
its spy war—its quiet war—against the United 
States. 
Ironically, Admiral Canaris personally 
opposed Adolf Hitler‘s regime.6 Brutal mass 
executions following the Nazis‘ Blitzkrieg against 
Poland in 1938 had prompted Canaris to question 
Hitler‘s intentions in occupying Poland. He 
demanded an explanation for the ―outrages‖ 
committed there by the Nazis, fearing that the world 
would ―‗eventually blame the Wehrmacht‘‖ for 
merely carrying out ―‗these unheard-of atrocities‘‖ 
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of Hitler‘s personal ambitions.7 The prevalent 
German ―monstrosity‖ in Poland, coupled with 
Hitler‘s willingness to go to war against England—
whose potential future support from the United 
States ―frightened‖ Canaris—cemented tensions 
between the admiral and his Führer.
8
 Nevertheless, 
Canaris had to perform his duty—if not for the 
Führer, then for Germany.  
Canaris and the Abwehr were far from alone 
in Germany‘s intelligence services, however. The 
Sicherheitdeinst (―security service‖) and 
Reichsicherheitshauptamt (―main security agency of 
the [German] empire,‖ also known as the R.S.H.A.) 
supplemented one another while the Luftwaffe even 
maintained its own research office, specializing in 
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―signal intelligence.‖9 Despite this extensive 
intelligence bureaucracy, whose very intricacy 
likely hampered the efficiency of gathering and 
transmitting reliable intelligence, the Abwehr took 
the lead in initiating espionage in the United 
States.
10
 The United States also had secret designs, 
however, and stood as ready to infiltrate Germany 
with its own spies as it was to intercept Nazi 
saboteurs in American territory. 
Admiral Canaris had an equally shrewd 
American counterpart in William Donovan, head of 
the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.). The 
precursor to the C.I.A., the O.S.S. emerged from a 
primitive intelligence agency, the Office of the 
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Coordinator of Information (C.O.I.), which 
Donovan had also directed.
11
 Following America‘s 
entry into World War II, the propaganda wing of the 
C.O.I. separated from the organization and the 
C.O.I. thereafter became the Office of War 
Information; it was soon renamed the Office of 
Strategic Services and placed under the watchful 
eye of William Donovan.
12
 
William Donovan hardly qualified as a 
mainstream intelligence director. A wealthy 
corporate lawyer of Republican persuasion, 
Donovan nonetheless had President Franklin 
Roosevelt‘s support in creating an ―international 
secret service‖ for the United States ―equal to the 
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Nazi challenge.‖13  Even Roosevelt, who ―saved 
Donovan‘s bureaucratic life‖ on more than one 
occasion, purportedly warned, ―‗We must find a 
way to harness this guy, because if we don‘t he will 
be doing a lot of things other than what we want 
him to do.‘‖14 The Joint Chiefs concurred with 
Roosevelt, reluctant to bring Donovan‘s 
―propaganda machinery‖ into the military realm; 
they did, however, agree to absorb the O.S.S. 
without its propaganda wing.
15
 
The Joint Chiefs relegated Donovan‘s new 
organization to two primary functions: to ―‗collect 
and analyze such strategic information as may be 
required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff‘‖ and to ―‗plan 
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and operate such special services as may be 
directed.‘‖16  On June 13, 1942, President Roosevelt 
issued an executive order authorizing the creation of 
the O.S.S. Though empowered by this move, the 
savvy Donovan knew not to overstep his bounds: 
―‗[T]hese admirals and generals might be willing to 
sit down with citizen Donovan, but not with 
General Donovan.‘‖17  Colleague Allen Dulles 
sensed an ―indefatigable energy‖ and ―great 
resourcefulness‖ in the former World War I war 
hero, foreshadowing the remarkable creativity with 
which the O.S.S. would operate under Donovan‘s 
leadership.
18
    
                                                 
16
 Join Chiefs directive, as quoted in Martin, "OSS 
into CIA," 181. 
17
 Donovan, as quoted in Joseph E. Persico, 
Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage, 
187. 
18
 Dulles, as quoted in Smith, OSS, 2. 
 232 
O.S.S. planning chief James Grafton Rogers 
reflected on the new agency with amusement, 
intrigue, and in a sense, fascination: 
The Office is the most interesting collection 
of people and their doings I have ever served 
in or known. Yale, the State Department, the 
old ―Sun,‖ the Cactus Club, the university at 
Boulder—all were less colorful. It may 
expire any minute. I feel every day is the 
last. The Joint Staff is trying to understand it 
and knows the ability collected and needed 
for some organization of organized and 
secret subversion. It recognizes R. and A. is 
a wonderful information service. But it may 
lose patience.
19
  
 
Rogers‘s pithy description encapsulates the 
character of the O.S.S. Here was a body of 
incomparably diverse individuals working—
independently and in tandem—toward the same 
goal: a war of subversion. William Donovan had 
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every right to be cautious as the Joint Chiefs 
struggled to grasp the nature of this mysterious new 
intelligence agency, its capacity and its limitations. 
Donovan seemed to understand the fragility of the 
O.S.S. as well as anyone could have: until the 
agency could prove its worth, it had to tread 
cautiously. 
Of O.S.S. ―planning,‖ James Rogers noted: 
The work is like watching a kaleidoscope. 
The pattern is changed every morning. Bill 
Donovan dreams up something overnight 
perhaps. A mission to Brazil—need for an 
overall psychological warfare plan, a 
venture in North Africa, a revision of the 
whole O.S.S. show. I never wake up to see 
what I went to bed with.
20
  
 
The O.S.S. operated extemporaneously; yet, this 
appeared to be one of its greatest assets. For 
William Donovan, rigidity inhibited innovation; and 
so the men of the O.S.S were encouraged to work as 
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pioneers, not as order-takers. As O.S.S. Colonel 
David Bruce remarked, ―‗Woe to the officer who 
turned down a project because, on its face, it 
seemed ridiculous, or at least unusual.‘‖21  
William Donovan infused his independence 
of mind into the O.S.S. Appreciated and respected 
within the O.S.S., Donovan sometimes met bitter 
resistance outside the organization. One of his most 
contentious relationships was with J. Edgar Hoover, 
of whom Donovan became a nominal boss 
following his appointment as Assistant Attorney 
General in 1924.
22
 By 1942, tensions between the 
two men had mounted, not dissipated. Concerned 
over whether Spain would remain neutral as the 
Allies prepared their invasion of North Africa, the 
O.S.S. authorized a mission to photograph ―cipher 
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pads to [of?] the Spanish diplomatic code.‖23 As 
O.S.S. agents were opening the safe, FBI agents 
stormed the location, arrested the O.S.S. men and 
confiscated their stolen material, prompting 
Donovan to state, ―‗The Abwehr gets better 
treatment from the FBI than we do.‘‖24 The silent 
war between the Abwehr and the O.S.S. had begun; 
but in the meantime, the FBI was fighting its own 
war—not on the European mainland, but on the 
American home front. 
With a significant population of German-
Americans, the United States faced dissent from 
within. Unlike prior waves of immigrants, German 
immigrants in the twentieth century came to 
America driven more by ―material incentives‖ than 
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―democratic conviction.‖25 Still harboring pro-
German sentiments, millions of German-Americans 
resided in the land of one of Nazi Germany‘s most 
formidable foes.
26
 Organizations like the German-
American Bund, under the leadership of the 
National Socialists Bund‘s Fritz Gissibl and Sepp 
Schuster, sparked suspicion and concern over 
domestic subversion. Gissibl also helped found the 
ominously-named organization, ―Friends of New 
Germany.‖27   
Even more ominous was the prospect of 
radicals like Gissibl and Schuster returning to Nazi 
Germany. Both men, in fact, returned and founded 
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the Kameradschaft U.S.A.
28
 German intelligence 
organizations like the Abwehr thus had an 
accessible pool of disloyal Americans to facilitate, 
and participate in, their espionage operations in the 
United States.  
 The arrest of Carl Herman Schroetter on 
September 2, 1941, in Miami reinforced fears over a 
German ―fifth column‖ in America. Schroetter, born 
in Switzerland and educated in Germany, 
immigrated to the United States in 1913. He settled 
into an unsuspicious identity and operated the 
charter boat, Echo of the Past.
29
 Schroetter 
allegedly garnered and dispatched information 
―concerning the national defense‖ to Kurt Frederick 
Ludwig, a German agent operating out of New 
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York City.
30
 Schroetter‘s arrest proved even more 
symbolic than efficacious in the U.S.-Germany 
intelligence war: ―Schroetter‘s arrest emphasizes 
the alertness with which the FBI is maintaining its 
vigil against possible spies.‖31  
This deliberate statement, unlike others in 
the article, suggests that Americans became 
concerned about internal dangers and needed 
assurance that authorities like the FBI were doing 
all in their power to protect the American 
homeland. Federal Judge Henry W. Goddard 
sentenced Carl Schroetter to ten years in prison, half 
of Ludwig‘s sentence.32   
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Curiously, Goddard also sentenced Lucy 
Boehmler, a high school student, to five years in 
―women‘s reformatory‖ at the Alderson Federal 
Prison in West Virginia for exclaiming that she 
―found espionage lots of fun.‖33 Boehmler had, in 
fact, accompanied Kurt Ludwig on his missions and 
assisted him in establishing contact with American 
military personnel, typically in army camps and 
nearby taverns.
34
 Upon further examination, it 
seems that Boehmler—hardly an innocent, 
―misguided‖ bystander—had actually facilitated 
Nazi intelligence operations in the U.S. that led to 
the sinking of ―allied ships sailing from New 
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York.‖35 According to a government witness, the 
spy ring with which Boehmler associated herself 
relayed vital information that reached as high in the 
German hierarchy as SS chief and Gestapo 
overseer, Heinrich Himmler.
36
  
In light of these unfortunate details, 
especially, Judge Goddard‘s punishment seems not 
only appropriate, but also lenient, for the damage 
Boehmler helped inflict—without remorse—all in 
the spirit of ―fun.‖ Boehmler‘s actions underscore 
the tense wartime environment in 1940s America. 
Citizens who facilitated German espionage were 
feared and perhaps looked upon with even more 
contempt than German spies. For beyond being 
enemies of the state, American subversives had 
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betrayed their home, the beacon of opposition to 
Fascism and Communism alike, and defected to the 
nefarious interests of the fascist Nazi regime. 
Boehmler‘s anti-American activities establish the 
context so critical to evaluating both the real and 
perceived Nazi threats to the nation. For many 
American citizens, the threat of Nazi espionage was 
real; on several occasions, they were correct. Three 
unanticipated events in the coming two years were 
about to confirm their anxiety. 
German espionage had yielded only modest 
gains since the arrest and detainment of thirty-three 
Nazi agents following an FBI raid in July 1941.
37
  
The raid, declared “the nation‘s biggest spy suspect 
roundup,” hindered, but did not incapacitate, Nazi 
                                                 
37
 Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War, 184. 
 242 
intelligence-gathering in the United States.
38
 
Arraigned on charges of “acting as agents for a 
foreign government without so registering‖ and 
―conspiracy to transmit vital information to a 
foreign government,‖ twenty-three of the thirty-
three suspects pleaded not guilty.
39
 On January 2, 
1941, the suspects received an aggregate two 
hundred sixty-eight years of imprisonment, with the 
―heaviest‖ sentences of eighteen years given to 
Herman Lang, Edmund Carl Heine, and Frederick 
Joubert Duquesne—all native citizens—for relaying 
―details of the Norden bombsight to Germany.‖40  
Ironically, Germany‘s most threatening 
intelligence presence in America may have been its 
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most visible. German diplomatic officials alone 
offered German intelligence services unique 
vehicles for acquiring and delivering information—
a less suspicious method of gathering intelligence 
prevalent throughout history since the time of the 
Byzantine Empire.
41
 In many cases, clandestine 
intelligence agents merely confirmed information 
already acquired from German diplomats.
42
 
Overseeing clandestine operations, the 
Abwehr had, in fact, been ―up to its neck in 
sabotage operations in the United States‖ for quite 
some time.
43
 Despite setbacks such as the FBI raid 
in the summer of 1944, the Abwehr persisted with 
its operations in the ―lion‘s den.‖ Under pressure 
from Hitler to ―disrupt American armaments 
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production,‖ Canaris authorized Operation 
PASTORIUS, named after one of Germany‘s first 
settlers in America, Franz Pastorius.
44
 In what 
Colonel Lahousen, the head of Abwehr‘s successor 
agency, Abwehr II, called ―‗the biggest blunder that 
ever occurred in Abwehr II,‘‖ eight German agents 
set out on a futile mission aimed at aluminum 
production sites—critical to the supply of American 
aircraft—in Philadelphia, Massena, New York, East 
St. Louis, Illinois and Alcoa, Tennessee.
45
   
Intriguingly, their more general mission was 
to incite American furor through acts of sabotage. 
Americans would consequently direct their outrage 
and suspicions toward German-Americans living in 
the United States, thus prompting them to form a 
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―fifth column‖ movement within America.46 All 
eight agents had lived in the United States at one 
time; two were American citizens, reaffirming 
public concerns over subversive pro-German 
sympathizers residing in America.
47
 
Georg Dasch, Ernest Burger, Herbert Haupt, 
Edward Kerling, Richard Quirin, Hermann 
Neubauer, and Werner Thiel—all had left for 
Germany on their own volition, ―inspired by the 
glowing promise of the Third Reich.‖48 Nazi 
intelligence missions in the United States seemed to 
revolve around a few common objectives covering a 
gamut of vital American targets: 
 Track American advances in science and 
technology. 
 Assess American political trends and 
their impact on foreign policy.  
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 Obtain information on tensions between 
Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill (for 
exploitation).  
 Keep abreast of potential invasion plans.  
 Accurately estimate America‘s 
production figures and judge its fighting 
and logistics potentials accordingly. 
 Conduct sabotage, primarily for 
―creating bottlenecks in the American 
economy.‖49  
Operation PASTORIUS agents focused more on 
active sabotage than passive espionage, destruction 
more than observation. This correlated with a shift 
in German intelligence efforts after America‘s 
declaration of war; for Germany‘s most noteworthy 
and therefore likely more successful intelligence 
operations were primarily those of sabotage, not 
espionage.
50
 Aware of America‘s potential strength, 
Hitler sought to weaken America‘s production 
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capacity; and so the agents prepared to oblige their 
Führer—for the time being.51  
The eight operatives were divided into two 
U-boats—one team led by Georg Dasch, the other 
by Edward Kerling.
52
 With $174,588 in American 
bills, the teams mobilized for their high-risk mission 
approved by Admiral Canaris, who immediately 
thereafter offered a foreboding caveat: ―This will 
cost these poor men their lives.‖53 Canaris, an 
apparent pragmatist often left at the whim of his 
impractical Führer, had few illusions regarding the 
mission‘s success; he could only oblige. 
Departing Continental Europe, eight agents 
of the fatherland set out on their task to breed chaos 
on the American mainland and sabotage ―aluminum 
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and power plants, railroad right of ways and Ohio 
River locks.‖54 The agents had studied drawings of 
New York City‘s water supply system and even the 
hydroelectric plant at Niagara Falls.
55
 In their ―spare 
time,‖ they were to incite fear among the American 
population with explosives disguised as innocuous 
objects like ―fountain pens, and pencils, others 
briquettes of coal.‖56  
On June 13, under cover of darkness, U-202 
(the Innsbruck), carrying Georg Dasch and his 
team, came to a stop within 500 miles of the Long 
Island shore.
57
 The team was then paddled to the 
shore by some of the Innsbruck‘s crew, and set foot 
on a beach not far from Amagansett. As they buried 
gear they no longer needed, Dasch‘s team heard a 
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discomfiting shout of ―Who are you?‖ from John 
Cullen, a rookie Coast Guardsman.
58
 The foolhardy 
Dasch gave Cullen $260, and simply replied, 
―Forget about this.‖59 Cullen relayed his encounter 
to the Coast Guard, who reported the incident to the 
FBI.
60
 (―Greedy and unscrupulous,‖ Dasch may 
have plotted to keep the money used to finance the 
operation after betraying his fellow agents to the 
FBI.)
61
 
Upon reaching New York, about 105 miles 
away, Dasch and his three fellow operatives 
checked into the Martinique and Governor Clinton 
Hotels—Heinck and Quirin into the Martinique, 
Dasch and Berger into the Governor Clinton. Dasch 
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and his partners made the most of their excursion to 
America, ―investing‖ their money in luxury and 
pleasure, ―expensive clothes and fancy 
restaurants.‖62 Among these indulgences was a 
supposed 36-hour pinochle game.
63
  
According to Albert Cox, jailer and 
custodian of the agents following their 
apprehension, Dasch and Ernst Burger had already 
agreed to betray their mission to the FBI after their 
shore landing.
64
 Joseph Persico, in Roosevelt’s 
Secret War, claims the agreement was made later, in 
a ―cautious conversation‖ at the Governor Clinton, 
during which Dasch convinced Burger of their 
mission‘s futility. Dasch, according to Persico, 
allegedly suggested that, if the men turned 
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themselves in, they would not only be treated with 
leniency, but even esteem.
65
 Burger, who had once 
endured torture and his pregnant wife‘s miscarriage 
during a 17-month internment in a concentration 
camp at the hands of the Gestapo, probably had few 
qualms about turning himself in.
66
  
As Dasch immersed himself in the high life, 
he was merely buying time for their eventual 
betrayal of the saboteurs‘ mission. He told Burger 
to keep the ―‗two Dutchmen‘‖—what Dasch and 
Burger called their ―less Americanized German 
colleagues‖—at bay as he established contact with 
the FBI.
67
 After attempting to call J. Edgar Hoover, 
Dasch eventually made contact with an FBI agent 
and soon exposed his entire operation to the FBI in 
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full detail at FBI headquarters in Washington, 
D.C.
68
 His three partners waited in New York—
only Burger knew their future. They were 
subsequently apprehended with ease.
69
  
Meanwhile, four days after Dasch and his 
partners had landed on the Long Island shore, the 
second PASTORIUS team—Edward Kerling, 
Herbert Haupt, Hermann Neubauer and Werner 
Thiel—made landfall on Ponte Vedra Beach. Albert 
Cox suggests that, had Dasch not so luxuriated in 
New York, the FBI could have apprehended the 
Florida spy team sooner.
70
 Dasch did divulge the 
Florida team‘s operation to the FBI, but the delay 
proved inconvenient.
71
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Dasch‘s and Burger‘s partners showed no 
more devotion to their mission. Herbert Haupt 
traveled to Chicago, where he was to acquire an 
automobile and an employment position at the 
Simpson Optical Company, where he had once 
worked. (Haupt even found time to visit his parents, 
who lived in the city; his parents, uncle and aunt 
were later convicted of treason for providing him 
aid and comfort.
72
) There, he would evaluate the 
plant‘s vulnerabilities and relay his findings to his 
partners, who would sabotage the plant accordingly. 
Observing Haupt since he entered Chicago, federal 
agents apprehended him on June 27, 1942, before 
sabotage plans could be executed. Following his 
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arraignment on July 21, Haupt ―volunteered 
considerable information‖ to two FBI agents.73  
By June 27, seven of the eight agents had 
been apprehended, the last soon to be arrested.
74
 
Nearly all the agents‘ American bills were 
recovered as well. Franklin D. Roosevelt needed 
little time to assess the spies‘ punishment, writing in 
a memo to Attorney General Francis Biddle, ―‗The 
two Americans are guilty of treason.‘‖75 Of the 
other six, Roosevelt incorporated a historical 
analogy favorable to his view: ―‗They were 
apprehended in civilian clothes. This is an absolute 
parallel of the Case of Major [John] Andre in the 
Revolution and of Nathan Hale. Both of these men 
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were hanged.‘‖76 Roosevelt concluded with an 
unambiguous decision: ―‗The death penalty is called 
for by usage and by the extreme gravity of the war 
aim and the very existence of our American 
government.‘‖77  
Roosevelt personally desired strict legal 
measures against the enemy spies and, through 
forcefulness, was determined to get his way: ―‗I 
want one thing clearly understood, Francis: I won‘t 
give them up…I won‘t hand them over to any 
United States Marshall armed with a writ of habeas 
corpus. Understand!‘‖78 Biddle, who found himself 
―trapped between the President‘s questionable 
pressure and his own reverence for the law,‖ abided 
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and the agents were ultimately tried by military 
tribunal.
79
   
Besides its wartime significance, the 
saboteurs‘ trial set several important precedents. For 
the first time in the history of the Supreme Court, its 
justices were called from their vacations to convene 
―midway through the trial.‖ Not only did this 
assembly alone make history; the trial itself did, as 
well. This was one of the few times that a special 
military commission was ever called upon in the 
nation‘s history. Furthermore, while all Supreme 
Court Justices returned from their vacations, one of 
the nine, Frank Murphy, did not partake in ―that 
strange two-day mid-July sitting.‖80 Albert Cox, the 
agents‘ custodian and thus, acting defendant during 
this brief span, later recalled: 
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Justice Frank Murphy, was then a 
Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army, stationed at 
Fort Benning. During the proceedings he 
remained in uniform, within earshot but out 
of sight of counsels and spectators, sitting 
behind the curtain which shields the goings 
and comings of the robed Justices between 
their bench and the robing room. This, too, 
must have been unprecedented in the 
Supreme Court‘s annals.81 
 
The trial concluded on August 3, 1942, and the 
PASTORIUS agents were convicted.
82
   
The agents‘ convictions brought more 
scrutiny of the legal status of spies than was present 
before the trial began, for it opened a debate that 
resounds today as the United States weighs similar 
issues with a different enemy: 
Some laymen have expressed the opinion 
that the saboteurs should not have been 
given any sort of trial, that they should have 
been summarily shot just as American 
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agents in Germany would have been. But the 
greatest tests of the principles for which we 
are fighting comes when we must apply 
them to those who would destroy them. 
Justice must be done—but not by illegal, or 
even questionable means.
83
  
 
William P. Armstrong, in his Presidential Address 
to the American Bar Association, expressed similar 
sentiments, with accolades for the manner in which 
justice was carried out without partiality, 
obstruction, or exploitation:  
The recent trial and proceedings in 
connection with the trial of the Nazi 
saboteurs reflected great credit upon the 
nation. It was a practical demonstration that 
we actually believe in the things for which 
we are fighting. The accused were accorded 
the benefit of counsel who were not only 
sworn to defend them, but who, as I can 
testify from personal observation, performed 
that duty in a way that measured up to the 
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finest traditions of the American Bar and 
reflected great credit upon our profession.
84
 
 
Evocative of John Adams‘s defense of a 
Redcoat charged for his participation in the Boston 
Massacre (though under different circumstances), 
Armstrong‘s argument advocates America‘s 
adherence to an ideal legal standard—one whose 
application, particularly in wartime, might be called 
into question; it was in 1942, and remains 
controversial today. Arguing that the nation should 
bestow certain rights shared by its own citizens to 
its enemies, Armstrong raises concerns equally 
relevant in the modern world. Armstrong‘s 
interpretation of the legal proceedings corresponds 
with that of Franklin Roosevelt Administration‘s 
public opinion, but Roosevelt‘s personal will lurked 
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in the background. Roosevelt, in fact, ordered the 
military trial proceedings to be kept secret.
85
   
Probing further into the evaluation of the 
military commission itself, one comes upon another 
familiar argument—in this particular case, the 
implications of the Supreme Court‘s decision to 
uphold the agents‘ plea for a writ of habeas corpus 
and a public trial by ―civil authorities.‖86      
When read as a whole, the preliminary 
decision indicates that the court is not going 
to hold that alien enemies have no rights, but 
that modern military developments have 
made it necessary to redefine and even to 
expand the jurisdiction of the military.
87
 
 
Sounding more like excerpts from a philosophical 
treatise, these evaluations of the Nazi saboteurs‘ 
treatment and trial nonetheless capture the 
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complexity and controversy of how to punish 
threats to America‘s national security, particularly 
in wartime.  
Reading carefully, it would be difficult not 
to notice a parallel between this rhetoric of more 
than six decades past and rhetoric Americans might 
hear today in an age of pronounced terrorism. Thus, 
stepping back from the microscopic view of the 
trial, one discovers its more overarching 
significance. The Nazi saboteur trial not only 
reasserted America‘s legal stance against malicious 
enemy agents; it also laid a foundation for 
contemporary political, judicial and international 
discourse on an issue that has seemingly found little 
resolution since the 1940s: how to legally define 
enemies and try them according to increasingly 
complex—and yet, ambiguous—legal guidelines. 
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On August 8, 1942, saboteurs Edward John 
Kerling, Herbert Hans Haupt, Richard Quirlin, 
Warren Thiel, Hermann Otto Neubauer, and 
Heinrich Harm Hencke were executed by 
electrocution. (Georg Dasch and Ernest Berger were 
found guilty and eventually deported.) Of the 
aftermath, The Chronicler‘s Report for 1942 tersely 
noted: ―The bodies were interred at Blue Plains.‖88  
On a casual glance, this brief statement 
would be the only legacy left by the agents and the 
trial by which they were convicted. However, 
delving into the fascinating account of their 
adventures in America—for a mission whose failure 
seemed all too clear from the start—one discovers a 
remarkable storyline fit for a novel, but with the 
reality of wartime fear, suspicion, and danger. One 
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discovers how an unarmed nineteen-year-old high 
school student can hamper a nation‘s war effort; 
how eight men in a war fought by millions 
fomented anxieties shared by numerous American 
citizens during wartime; and how these men 
inspired legal precedents and bred controversy that 
remains to this day. These are the stories hidden 
behind the popular images and memories of World 
War II, but they are no less important. For behind 
the thundering of artillery fire, the masses of 
opposing armies in relentless struggle, and the 
horrors left in the aftermath of battle lies a war in 
the shadows—the quiet war. 
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